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RÉSUMÉ 
Ces jours-ci, globalisation a formé l’environnement économique du monde d’un côté et de l’autre 
côté, conduit à surligner l’importance d’intégration économique. Donc,  l’augmentation de la 
vitesse du développement des entreprises et des pays après l’intégration n’est pas un grand 
surpris.  
Les études récentes ont montré la création des alliances ou réseaux économiques est une des 
méthodes des plus effectives pour  faire face aux nouvelles opportunités et défis mondiale.  
La question principale c’est que si l’union monétaire doit être suivie est adressée par OCA, qui 
est un point de départ utile pour quelconque discussion sur l’intégration régionale.    
Le but de cette étude est  l’analyse du niveau d’intégration entre les pays du Moyen-Orient et 
pays Afrique du nord en relation avec l'union européenne. En fait, le niveau d’intégration entre 
trois régions est étudié, l'Union Méditerranéenne, la région du MENA et huit pays choisis de la 
région MENA. L’étude présente sélectionne 12 pays de la région MENA et EU dans son 
ensemble. Tous les pays Méditerranéens ne sont pas inclus dans cette étude à cause de quelques 
barrières incluant indisponibilité des données. 12 pays la région du MENA sont Albanie, Algérie, 
Croatie, Égypte, Israël, Jordanie, Liban, Mauritanie,Maroc,Syrie,TunisieetTurquie. 
Un modèle de la gravité augmentée est utilisé. La variable dépendant de ce modèle est l’export de 
la chaque économie à ses partenaires. Les variables indépendantes sont : les variables de la 
gravité traditionnelle, les variables d'Hecksher Ohlin et variables de convergence. On utilise aussi 
analyse section transversale des séries chronologiques basant sur le commerce bilatéral. Les 
données couvrent la période du 1995 à 2010. 
Notre analyse indique que la perspective pour plus d’intégration des trois régions 
est espérant et encouragent mais encore il reste plusieurs défis. Ces trois défis doivent être 
comme les relations politiques ou quelques bloquent économiques existants, qui fournissent un 
tremplin vers l’union monétaire plus grand. 
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ABSTRACT 
Nowadays, the forces of globalization, on the one hand, have shaped the world’s economic 
environment and on the other hand, led to the increased importance of economic integration.  
Hence, a faster growth of corporations and countries after they integrated is not a big surprise. 
Recent studies have shown that the creation of an economic alliance or network is one of the 
most effective methods to face new global economic opportunities and challenges. The central 
question of whether a monetary union should be pursued is addressed by the OCA, which is a 
useful starting point for any discussion on regional integration. 
The goal of this study is to analyse the level of integration among the Middle Eastern and North 
African countries, in relationship with the European Union. In fact, the level of integration in 
three regions is examined: the Mediterranean Union, the MENA region and eight selected 
countries from the MENA region. The present study selects 12 countries within the MENA 
region and the EU as a whole. All countries of the Mediterranean region are not included in this 
study due to some barriers such as the unavailability of data. 12 countries from the MENA region 
are Albania, Algeria, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, 
Tunisia, and Turkey. 
An augmented gravity model is used. The dependent variable in this model is exports from each 
economy to its partners. Independent variables are: traditional gravity variables, Hecksher Ohlin 
variables and convergence variables. We use a cross-section time-series analysis based on the 
bilateral trade. The data cover the period from 1995 to 2010. 
Our analysis shows that the prospect for further integration of the three regions is promising and 
looks encouraging, but many challenges still persist. These challenges could be such as political 
relationships or some existing economic blocks, which provide a first stepping stone to a larger 
currency union. 
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CHAPITRE 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Importance of the Study 
Nowadays, the forces of globalization (i.e. faster communication, more efficient transportation, 
increased flow of goods and services, labour mobility and more rapid financial flows) have two 
impacts.  On the one hand, they have shaped the world’s economic environment and on the other 
hand, led to the increased importance of economic integration.  In addition, it is widely accepted 
that the world is getting smaller and interconnecting and economic integration has led to the 
interaction and cooperation of companies and countries. Hence, a faster growth of corporations 
and countries after they integrated is not a big surprise. Recent studies have shown that the 
creation of an economic alliance or network is one of the most effective methods to face the new 
global economic opportunities and challenges (Ghadar 2006).   
When it comes to evaluating the conditions of integrating countries, the academic literature relies 
essentially on one approach: the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory. The central question of 
whether a monetary union should be pursued is addressed by the OCA theory, which is a useful 
starting point for any discussion on regional integration (Nnanna 2009).  
Robert Mundell in 1961 formulated the OCA theory and defined it in terms of an optimal 
geographic area, which adopts a single currency, or several currencies, whose exchange rates are 
permanently pegged.  The notion of optimality relies on multiple conditions. These conditions 
include factor mobility of production, price and wage flexibility, economic openness, 
consumption and production diversification, similarity in inflation rates, political integration and 
fiscal integration (Mundell 1961). To refine the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory, the 
Endogeneity of Optimum Currency Area (EOCA) theory was pioneered by Frankel and Rose in 
1998. They showed that reciprocal trade is improved significantly by monetary integration. The 
main focus in the context of the endogeneity of OCA theory is that the OCA criteria likely will be 
achieved by sharing a single currency ex-post even if they do not ex-ante (Frankel and Rose 
1998).  
 
2 
 
1.2  Areas of the Study and Their Importance 
In this study, the level of integration in three regions is examined base on the time period from 
1995 to 2010: 
 The Mediterranean Union, 
 The MENA region and, 
 Eight countries from the MENA region 
The Mediterranean Union contains 43 countries, 27 member states of the European Union (EU) 
and 16 countries from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA region). The Union is 
considered as a new phase of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (also known as the Barcelona 
Process). Geographical proximity and economic growth in the Mediterranean countries play an 
important role in promoting integration. Hence, renewed growth in the Mediterranean countries 
will promote greater regional integration, both with the European countries and within Southern 
Mediterranean (Ülgen 2011).  
Openness of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region to the global economy has been 
improved today more than in the early 1990s and the participation of the region to the global 
economy has been increased significantly. In this regard, tariffs have been reduced under the Pan-
Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA), intra-regional tourism is growing, and transport connectivity is 
improving. Still, the MENA region, compared to the other regions, is less globally and regionally 
integrated in terms of trade, investment and capital flows – with the exception of oil – to obtain 
the benefits of the current wave of globalization. In the Southern Mediterranean, The lack of an 
integrated market as well as the complicated set of rules of origin cause a shift of foreign 
investments to the North. A European investor can easily serve all the MENA markets while a 
MENA investor have difficulties due to the holes in the set of bilateral trade agreements among 
the MENA countries. Under these conditions, a fundamental rethink of the economic integration 
between the North and South of the Mediterranean should be considered (WorldBank 2010; 
Ülgen 2011).  
 
3 
 
1.3  Goal and Research Questions 
The goal of this research is to analyse the level of integration among: 
 The Middle Eastern and Northern African countries, in relationship with the European 
Union. 
 The Middle Eastern and Northern African countries (MENA region). 
 A selection of countries from the MENA region. 
In fact, this study aims at answering the following questions: 
 What are the main criteria to determine the suitability of integration for the Mediterranean 
union? 
The domain of the study for the Mediterranean union in this research is the European Union and 
12 countries from the MENA region: 
 What are the main criteria to determine the suitability of integration for the MENA 
region? 
The domain of the study for the MENA region is the 12 mentioned countries in the first question. 
 What are the main criteria to determine the suitability of integration for the eight selected 
countries from the MENA region? 
Among the 12 countries from the MENA region in our sample, 8 countries are selected based on 
a procedure explained in chapter 5. The methodology adopted in this section has devoted a large 
part in the originality of this research, since it has been developed by the author. The 
methodology is developed based on classifying the tables investigated in the descriptive analysis 
in chapter 4. In section 5.5.1 the methodology is explained in detail.   
 
1.4  Project Structure 
This study is structured in six chapters, starting with the explanation of the interest of this study 
and its aims in Chapter 1. This is followed by identifying the importance of the investigated areas 
and research questions of the project. Chapter 2 presents a brief background on the two areas 
investigated in this study: the Mediterranean Union and the MENA region. Continuing with 
Chapter 3, the background of the study and its literature review, along with descriptions of the 
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gravity model (i.e. a model which supports investigation of the research questions stated in this 
study). Thereafter, the descriptive analysis of the data is discussed. Each country is considered as 
an exporter and its relationships with other economies in terms of dependent and independent 
variables are investigated in chapter 4. In chapter 5 the research strategy and methods, adopted in 
the empirical investigations, are discussed. The report is completed with the policy implications 
and a summary of the outcomes in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPITRE 2 BACKGROUND ON THE MEDITERRANEAN UNION 
AND THE MENA REGION  
2.1  Background on the Mediterranean Union 
The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is considered as a multi-lateral partnership, which 
contains 43 countries from Europe and the Mediterranean Basin (Wikipedia 2012): 
 27 member states of the union are from the European Union, namely:  
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. 
 16 member states of the union are from North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans, 
namely: 
Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, 
Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. 
 
2.1.1  History of the Mediterranean Union 
The Union for the Mediterranean is seen as an extension of the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP), which was launched in Barcelona (Spain) in 1995. According to the 1995 
Barcelona Declaration, the aim of this initiative is “turning the Mediterranean basin into an area 
of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity” (Xenakis and 
Chryssochoou 2001) 
At the start of its formation, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership included only 27 member 
countries, 15 of which from the European Union and 12 from the Mediterranean countries (i.e. 
Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, 
Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey). In consequence of the European Union enlargement in 2004 and 
2007, the number of EU member countries increased to 27, and two countries from the 
Mediterranean (i.e. Cyprus and Malta) became part of the European Union. Thus, due to the EU 
enlargement, the configuration of the Barcelona Process changed from "15+12" to "27+10". 
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Ultimately, by joining Albania and Mauritania to the Barcelona Process in 2007, the number of 
participants raised to 39 (Montobbio 2009). 
After the celebration of the 10th Anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Summit in Barcelona in 
2005, criticisms against the Barcelona Process increased (VoltaireNetwork 2005). Two main 
reasons for these criticisms are: firstly, nonattendance of heads of state and government from the 
Southern Mediterranean countries1 versus the attendance of the 27 European Union’s heads of 
state and government. Secondly, the lack of an agreement on the definition of the term 
“terrorism” is considered as a barrier to approve the final declaration. The Palestinian Authority, 
Syria and Algeria disagreed with the definition of the term “terrorism” if “resistance movements 
against foreign occupation” is part of the definition (European Commission 2005). 
After the criticisms against the Euro-Mediterranean Summit in Barcelona in 2005, the efficiency 
of the Barcelona Process for fulfilling its objectives of peace, stability and prosperity felt into the 
suspicion (Fernandez and Youngs 2005). For instance, the disappointment about the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership and its inability to deliver some results is expressed by a Spanish 
politician, namely Josep Borrell (Fontelles 2010). However, the validity of the Barcelona Process' 
framework has been defended by many European Union diplomats. 
 After the Barcelona Process, the idea of a ‘Union of the Mediterranean’ was developed 
originally by President Sarkozy during the French presidential election campaign in 2007. The 
idea was advanced during a speech in Tangier on 23 October 2007, according to which just the 
coastal states of the Mediterranean would aim at a “political, economic and cultural union … of 
which our children will be proud” (Emerson 2008). The idea was presented with strategic and 
historical importance. However, he had aimed to model the Mediterranean Union on the 
European Union with a shared judicial area and common institutions.  In addition, Mr. Sarkozy 
was thinking about Turkish membership of the Mediterranean Union as an alternative to 
membership of the European Union (Holm 2007).  A number of criticisms came across the 
proposal at the highest levels. 
                                                 
1 with the exception of the Palestinian and Turkish  
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Criticisms against the ‘Union of the Mediterranean’ 
First, due to the considering Turkish membership in the Mediterranean Union instead of in the 
European Union, the idea was rejected immediately by Turkey. Second, the European 
Commission agreed with the plans of promoting regional cooperation if they would be built 
based on the existing structures, specifically based on the Barcelona process. Third, on 5 
December 2007, Chancellor Merkel rejected the idea of having only the participation of countries 
bordering the Mediterranean, she stated (Emerson 2008): 
“This would create a situation I would qualify as dangerous. A situation could be created where 
Germany would be drawn to Central and Eastern Europe and France to the Mediterranean. This 
would create tension that I would not like.”  
In addition, German chancellor Angela Merkel was worried about the risk of splitting and 
threatening the core of the EU by the creation of the Mediterranean Union based on Mr. 
Sarkozy’s assumption. 
Fourth, at the time of Slovenian presidency of the EU in 2008, Prime Minister Janez Jansa added 
to the criticisms and indicated (Keller 2012):  
"We do not need a duplication of institutions, or institutions that would compete with EU, 
institutions that would cover part of the EU and part of the neighbourhood."   
However, among the EU member countries, the idea of the Mediterranean Union was supported 
by Italy, Spain, and Greece (DeutscheWelle 2007); while among the non EU members, the 
proposal was supported by Egypt and Israel (EJP 2007). 
Modified Proposal of ‘Union of the Mediterranean’ 
Against the opposition from the EU member countries and the European Commission, Sarkozy 
modified his plan for the Mediterranean Union at the start of 2008. These modifications are 
(EuropeanUnion 2008; Vucheva 2008): 
 At the end of February of 2008, France's minister for the European affairs, Jean-Pierre 
Jouyet, declared that “there is no Mediterranean Union” but rather a “Union for the 
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Mediterranean,” which its only concern is “completing and enriching” the already 
existing EU policies.   
 As a result of a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, all the EU member 
states were included in the project and the idea of having only the participation of 
countries bordering the Mediterranean was dropped. 
 The Union of the Mediterranean would be built based on the Barcelona process. 
 Turkish membership to the Union of the Mediterranean was no longer an alternative to its 
EU membership. This declaration was guaranteed from France, based on which Turkey 
accepted to participate to the project. 
 The proposition of creating common institutions was dropped as well.  
The Union for the Mediterranean Is Launched 
After several negotiations during a summit in Paris, the Union for the Mediterranean was 
launched on the 13th of July 2008 with the participation of 43 heads of state and government from 
the Euro-Mediterranean region. The Union is built upon the Barcelona Declaration and its 
objectives of achieving peace, stability and security. Also, it is considered a multilateral 
partnership with a vision to increase the potential for the regional integration. Heads of states 
emphasized the importance of co-ownership by all participants. They believed that the Euro-
Mediterranean region will meet common challenges due to the important role of this initiative. 
One of those common challenges is economic and social development, with a view to promote 
dialogues among cultures. The Paris summit was considered a diplomatic success for Nicolas 
Sarzoky. Besides, it was agreed to held biennial summits by heads of state and government. The 
results of the summits should be a political announcement and a short list of tangible regional 
projects to be set in the process. Progress in the implementation of the summit conclusions would 
be reviewed by the annual foreign affairs ministerial meetings. Also determining the next summit 
meetings and approving the new projects, in the case of necessity, are considered in the biennial 
summits. It was agreed that the summit meetings should take place in the EU and in the 
Mediterranean partner countries alternately. The host country is selected by consensus. All 
countries party to the initiative will be called to the summits, ministerials and other plenary 
meetings of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean (Declaration 2008). 
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2.1.2  Institutional Framework of the Mediterranean Union  
Any political union requires not only a financial and political support but also an institutional 
support. Several institutions were launched to support a better functioning of the UfM and for a 
better coordination among the states. 
To improve the political dialogue at the highest level, a summit of heads of state and government 
was planned to be held every two years. According to the Paris Declaration2 (Ilievska 2011): 
“Heads of State and Government agree to hold biennial summits. The summits should result in a 
political declaration and a short list of concrete regional projects to be set in motion. The 
Conclusions should endorse a broad two-year work programme for the Barcelona Process: 
Union for the Mediterranean. Annual Foreign Affairs Ministerial meetings will review progress 
in the implementation of the summit conclusions and prepare the next summit meetings and, if 
necessary, approve new projects.” 
The foundation for the functioning of the UfM was built based on the biennial summit. In other 
words, the biennial summits seemed to be a place in which most of the problems are expected to 
be resolved. 
The secretariat is another form of institutional support; two of its task is (Ilievska 2011):  
 Identifying and monitoring the implementation of the concrete projects for the Euro-
Mediterranean region;  
 Searching for the partners to finance these projects3. 
 
2.1.3  Co-Presidency 
In order to improve the stability and the joint ownership of the cooperation, heads of state and 
government set up a co-presidency; one from the EU while the other would be from the 
                                                 
2 Declaration, J. (2008). "Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean." URL: http://www. 
internationalepolitik. de/ip/archiv.  
3 Final Statement of the Marseille Meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs   
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Mediterranean partner countries. The co-presidency is applied to the summits, all ministerial 
meetings, the senior officials meetings, the Joint permanent committee and, whenever possible, 
experts/ad hoc meetings within the initiative. The rules of a co-presidency for the EU and the 
Mediterranean partners are such as (Declaration 2008; Statement 2008): 
 The co-presidency of the Partnership as a whole should be assumed by the co-presidents. 
 From the EU side, co-president must be compatible with the external representation of the 
European Union in accordance with the Treaty provisions4 in force; 
 From the Mediterranean side, the co-president must be chosen by consensus for a non-
renewable period of two years. 
 Necessary consultations with all partners will be performed by the co-presidencies in 
order to adopt common conclusions of Summit, Ministerial, and other meetings. 
2.1.4  Scope and Main Objectives 
It was agreed by the heads of state and government that the challenge of the "Barcelona Process: 
Union for the Mediterranean" is (Declaration 2008): 
 Enhancing multilateral relations; 
 Increasing co-ownership of the process; 
 Setting governance on the basis of equal footing and translate it into the concrete projects; 
 Progressing and economic benefits of the creation of a deep Free Trade Area and 
strengthening of regional economic integration in the Euromed region by 2010 and 
beyond;  
 Supporting the main lines of the Euromed Trade Roadmap till 2010 and beyond;  
 Studying the establishment of a smooth, efficient and business-friendly trade facilitation 
mechanism which would bring further transparency and trade and investment 
opportunities; 
 Implementing the projects in order to enhance the flow of exchanges among the people of 
the whole region and thus creating a future of peace and shared prosperity in the entire 
region. In this regard, the human and cultural dimension of the initiative was pointed out; 
                                                 
4 The provisions of the Treaties are the primary source of EU law. 
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 Improving the political level of the EU's relationship with its Mediterranean partners; 
 Providing more co-ownership to the multilateral relations; and  
 Making these relations more tangible and visible through the additional regional and sub-
regional projects. 
The main fields, which the UfM had in mind are (Process 1996): 
  Political and security basket: by defining a common area of peace and stability via 
reinforcement of political and security dialogue. 
 Economics and trade basket: by creating a zone of shared prosperity via an economic and 
financial partnership and the gradual configuration of a free-trade area. 
  Socio-cultural basket: by creating social, cultural and human partnership and 
rapprochement between peoples to encourage understandings among the cultures and 
exchanges among civil societies. 
2.1.5  Six Concrete Projects of the UfM 
As an addition to these chapters about cooperation, six concrete projects of the UfM were 
identified, which consider specific needs of the Euro-Mediterranean regions, such as 
(Declaration 2008; Ilievska 2011): 
 De-pollution of the Mediterranean. This broad project includes many plans such as 
good environmental governance, access to drinkable water, water management, 
pollution reduction, and protection of the Mediterranean biodiversity. 
 Maritime and land highways. Improving the circulation of commodities and people 
throughout the Euro-Mediterranean region is the intention of this project by 
improving ports, and building highways and railways.  
 Civil protection. The ultimate goal of this project is to bring the Mediterranean Partner 
Countries progressively closer to the European civil protection mechanism. 
 Alternative energies: Mediterranean solar plan. Promoting the production and use of 
renewable energies is the goal of this project  
 Higher education and research: Euro-Mediterranean University. As confirmed by the 
43 heads of state and government, the goal of this project is to promote higher 
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education and scientific research in the Mediterranean, also, to establish a "Euro-
Mediterranean Higher Education, Science and Research Area". 
 The Mediterranean business development initiative. The main goal of this initiative is 
to foster and promote small and medium-sized enterprises from the Mediterranean 
partner countries.  
2.1.6  Funding 
The Paris Declaration states that the capacity to attract funding from following resources will 
have to be developed by contributions for the Union for the Mediterranean. Resources are 
(Declaration 2008): 
 The private sector participation; 
 Contributions from the EU budget and all partners; 
 Contributions from other countries; 
 International financial institutions and regional entities; 
 The Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Facility (FEMIP); 
 The European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI).  
Contributions from the European Commission to the Union for the Mediterranean are performed 
through the European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI). In July 2009, €72 million were 
allocated by the ENPI for the following Union for the Mediterranean projects during 2009–2010 
(Lindh 2010):  
 De-pollution of the Mediterranean (€22 million); 
 Maritime and land highways (€7.5 million); 
 Alternative energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan (€5 million); 
 Euro-Mediterranean University of Slovenia (€1 million).  
Contributions from the European Investment Bank to the Union for the Mediterranean are 
performed through its Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP). Specifically, the 
Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Finance on 2008 mandated the FEMIP to support three of the 
six concrete projects (Lindh 2010):  
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 de-pollution of the Mediterranean;  
 alternative energies;  
 Maritime and land highways. 
$750 million have been allocated by the World Bank for the renewable energy project through 
the Clean Technology Fund. 
 
2.2  Background on the MENA Region 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is an economically diverse region consisting of 20 
countries ranging from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to the high-income countries. This 
region has a population of 355 million, with 85 percent living in the middle-income countries, 8 
percent in the high-income countries and 7 percent in the low-income countries (Saade 2012). 
2.2.1  Economic Performance of MENA Region 
During the last few years, a strong economic performance has been shown by the MENA region. 
A large share of this performance is derived by high oil prices and reform policies, which are 
generally on a positive track. The region’s growth performance was one of its best since the 
1970s. In 2007 and 2008, GDP at market prices grew at 5.8%, up from an average of 3.7% in the 
years of 1999-2000. However, due to the high population growth rates, growth of per capita 
income remains lower. Although the recent global financial and economic crisis in the MENA 
region has been weathered relatively well, it still faces daunting medium-term challenges. One of 
these challenges is high unemployment especially among the young people. The labour markets 
across the region have not improved much over the same period. In 2005 the unemployment rate 
in the MENA amounted to 12% on average, but varies significantly between the countries. 
Estimates of unemployment are very high and labour migration within and outside the region is a 
very frequent phenomenon. Therefore, the job creation remains a priority in the MENA region. 
Other challenges for the MENA are vulnerability to the oil and food price shocks and water 
scarcity and inefficiencies of the public sectors. Indeed, the MENA region is highly dependent on 
the oil and oil products. Up to 80% of merchandise exports belong to this group of products 
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despite the fact that diversification of exports is an important task to achieve a long-term 
sustainable economic performance (GTZ 2009). 
2.2.2 Three Groups of Countries within the MENA Region 
In order to adequately demonstrate the different economic characteristics of the MENA region, 
three groups of countries are distinguished by the World Bank (Abdo and Ayman 2010):  
 Resource-Poor, Labour-Abundant (RPLA: Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Palestinian Territories),  
 Resource-Rich, Labour-Abundant (RRLA: Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen); and  
 Resource-Rich, Labour-Importing (RRLI: Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and United Arab Emirates). 
Many of the labour-abundant countries rely on the export of labour. For countries such as Egypt, 
Jordan, Syria and Yemen, one of the most important sources of the foreign exchange is labour 
remittances. The region’s integration in terms of labour mobility is quite high in contrast to trade 
in goods and investment.  Regarding export markets for merchandise trade, the EU is a key 
destination for several North African countries, especially Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. In 
contrast, for the Middle Eastern countries, the other MENA economies are major export markets.  
Table 2.1 shows two main partners (in terms of share of total export) of selected countries from 
the MENA region. 
Table 2.1 Major trade partners of selected MENA countries (share of total exports in %) Data 
source: IMF DOTS 2006-retrieved from (GTZ 2009) 
 Algeria Egypt Jordan Morocco Syria Tunisia 
EU 27 53,9 38,2 3,6 71,9 32,2 78,1 
MENA 2,1 20,1 46,2 3,7 59,0 9,2 
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CHAPITRE 3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
3.1 A History of the Optimum Currency Area Theory 
An optimum currency area (OCA) is defined in terms of an optimal geographic area, which 
adopts a single or several currencies whose exchange rates are permanently pegged (IJssennagger 
and Ligthart).  The notion of optimality relies on several conditions. These conditions include 
factor mobility of production (labour and capital), price and wage flexibility, economic openness, 
consumption and production diversification, similarity in inflation rates, political integration, and 
fiscal integration.  Results of sharing the above conditions might be internally and externally 
balanced while reducing the impact of some types of shocks. Therefore, the usefulness of the 
nominal exchange rate as a mechanism of adjustments is reduced (Mongelli and Europeo 2002).  
In the context of the OCA theory, the terms “optimal” and “optimum” are interpreted in different 
ways. McKinnon (1963) refers the term of optimum to a currency area where three objectives 
are satisfied; two objectives of the internal equilibrium, which are full employment and a stable 
price level, and an objective of the external equilibrium, which is a balanced external account.  
In the sense of Grubel (1970) “optimal” is used to describe “the union between a number of 
regions or countries, which improves welfare of the population within these territories above the 
level enjoyed when each was a separate currency area.” Kenen, Dornbusch et al. (1980) believe 
that “optimal” in the OCA theory comes into the view when the costs of the balance-of-payments 
adjustment are minimized.  
The theory of optimum currency area determines the required conditions to be satisfied by 
countries in order to make a monetary union attractive.  In fact, the conditions ensure that the 
benefits of the monetary union exceed its costs (Kenny 2003).  
Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) are the main contributors to the OCA 
theory who have concentrated on the cost side of the cost-benefit analysis of a monetary union. 
Each argumentation by these three economists is discussed in details. 
3.1.1 Mundell Argumentation  
Robert Mundell was the first one to formulate the theory of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA). 
According to him, optimum currency areas are identified by economic regions, i.e. regions with 
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internal mobility on factors of production, labour and capital, and external immobility of factors. 
he expressed (Mundell 1961): 
“I have argued that the stabilization argument for flexible exchange rate is valid only if it is 
based on regional currency areas. If the world can be divided into regions within each of which 
there is factor mobility and between which there is factor immobility, then each of these regions 
should have a separate currency which fluctuates relative to all currencies.”  
Based on Mundell’s definition, an OCA is a currency area in which the benefits of adopting a 
single currency or a fixed exchange rate regime are greater than the costs of abandoning the 
exchange rate as an internal mechanism of adjustment (i.e. within the area). Countries with highly 
integrated relationships in terms of trade and other economic relations are more likely to form an 
optimum currency area (Frankel 1999). 
The main focus is on the costs of a monetary union. These costs refer the loss of a country’s 
ability to use the exchange rate as an instrument to deal with shocks in demand and supply. In 
fact, in a monetary union, there is a central bank which monitors and controls partner countries in 
the union and makes a central decision about a certain condition for all partners (Horvath and 
Komárek 2002).      
Mundell (1961) believes in the ability of factor mobility, especially labour mobility, to remove or 
at least reduce these costs. He also highlights the significant role of the price and wage flexibility 
as the instruments to deal with idiosyncratic demand shocks. Hence, there is no more need for 
changes in the exchange rate in an economy (region) with labour mobility or price and wage 
flexibility.  
Shift in Demand and Ability of Labour Mobility and Wage Flexibility  
Mundell (1961) developed the case of a demand shift in his famous article on the optimum 
currency areas. Imagine there is a shift away in aggregate demand from A-made to B-made 
products, e.g. due to a change in the preferences of consumers. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, this 
situation is presented by an upward movement in demand curve in B and a downward movement 
in A. In fact, as aggregate demand in A reduces, both output and price decreases in A. Also, by 
rising aggregate demand in B both output and price increases. Effects of these asymmetric shocks 
are unemployment in A and inflation in B. However, there are some mechanisms pushing back to 
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the initial equilibrium. Wage flexibility and mobility of labour are two adjustment instruments 
when countries A and B are trading from a monetary union. Following is the explanation for each 
mechanism (Kenny 2003).  
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 3.1 Shift in aggregate demand in A and B-retrieved from (Kenny 2003) . 
 
a. Wage flexibility. With wage flexibility in A and B, the following results are observed. 
Once unemployment occurred in A, workers decrease their wage claims. As a result, the 
supply curve moves downward in A. In addition, the wage rate is pushed up in B because 
of the excess demand for labour and consequently moving upward the supply curve in B. 
As illustrated in Figure 3.2, the equilibrium will be brought back by these shifts. In fact, 
products of country A are going to be more competitive because their price fall and so 
there will be a boost in demand for them. For B, the opposite would occur. Figure 3.2 
shows this adjustment. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Adjustment mechanism by wage flexibility retrieved from (De Grauwe 2007) 
 
b. Mobility of labour. With the possibility of labour mobility, excess demand for labour in 
B will be vanished by moving A’s unemployed labour to country B.  This movement 
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prevents the declining of wage in A and increasing of wage in B. As a result, there is no 
more unemployment in A and inflationary wage pressures in B. 
 Debates on Mundell Argumentation 
Mundell’s definition of an optimum area is the main focus of contention. Factor mobility, which 
Mundell had in mind, was about the geographic factor mobility. McKinnon (1963) indicates 
factor mobility in two separate senses: factor mobility among the regions and factor mobility 
among the industries. He argues that if the demand for A-made products falls, there is no great 
need for movements of factor from A to B if country A could make B-type products. However, if 
country A cannot develop B-type products, movements of factor from A to B prevent a fall of 
income in country A as a mechanism of adjustment. Nevertheless, McKinnon like Mundell 
believes that regions in which there is factor mobility should form a common currency area.  
However, some authors such as Kenen (1969), Grubel (1970) and (Giersch 1973) have some 
criticisms to Mundell’s argumentation. For instance, Kenen (1969) expresses that there should be 
perfect homogeneity of labours to have perfect interregional labour mobility. Grubel (1970) states 
that there is no certain declaration of levels of labour mobility in the context of regions in 
Mundell’s definition of region. Giersch (1973) believes that mobility is high in the long run and 
is a function of time; therefore the world should be an optimum currency area in the long run 
(Horvath 2003). 
3.1.2 McKinnon Argumentations  
McKinnon (1963) is the second who contributed to the theory of optimum currency area. In 
McKinnon’s view, the degree of openness is the main criterion to constitute an OCA; and defines 
it as the ratio of tradable to non-tradable goods. A fixed exchange rate is more advantageous for 
an open economy and there are more arguments for having a flexible exchange rate when 
economy is rather closed (Broz 2005). The following explanation shows that flexible exchange 
rates cannot be served as a mechanism of adjustment in an open economy.  
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Assume a small economy5 with a high ratio of tradable to non-tradable goods. Tradable include 
exportable, X1, and importable, X2, and non-tradable are defined as X3. Price of exportable, P1, 
and importable, P2, in domestic currency varies under a flexible exchange rate regime. So the 
fluctuations in exchange rate prevent a stable price level. McKinnon (1963) writes:  
“...if we move across the spectrum from closed to open economies, flexible exchange rates 
become both less effective as a control device for external balance and more damaging to 
internal price level stability.”  
However, a large economy will be less affected by the fluctuations in the exchange rate. The 
logic is that only a small part of GDP in a large economy is engaged in the foreign trade 
(McKinnon 1963).  
Giersch (1973) and Ishiyama (1975) criticized the McKinnon’s view. Ishiyama (1975) believes 
that McKinnon’s argumentation comes true if outside world price level is stable. However, 
stability of the outside world price level does not prevail in the real world. He says McKinnon’s 
argumentation could be reversed because domestic economy in which there is fixed exchange 
rate regime would be directly affected by the external instability.  
Giersch (1973) expresses that flexible exchange rate is more advantageous for open economies 
since it may be more affected by cyclical disturbances from outside world.  
3.1.3 Kenen Argumentations  
Kenen (1969) is the third important contributor to the OCA theory. Product diversification is 
introduced as an important criterion in forming an optimum currency area by Kenen.  
Kenen (1969) explains the application of diversification by an example. Assume a negative 
demand shock is exposed to a country, which is not diversified and only produces one product. 
The exports revenue of the single product of this country will fall since it is affected by the 
negative demand shock. React to this shock is different under the type of exchange rate regime. If 
                                                 
5 The likelihood of openness in a small economy is higher than in a large economy. For a small economy it is more 
efficient to produces only those goods in which it has competitive advantage. Also it is more efficient to engage in 
foreign trade to export produced goods and import other goods which it does not produce. 
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such a country is under a flexible exchange rate regime then the solution to this shock is 
depreciation of the exchange rate6. However, if the country in question has a fixed exchange rate 
regime, the equilibrium should be brought back through a reduction in wage or a raise in 
unemployment. Therefore, fixed exchange rate is not appropriate for an undiversified economy. 
Imagining a well-diversified economy in which, consequently, exporter sector is also diversified. 
Each kind of industry might be exposed to some kind of shock. A positive shock in one industry 
can be offset by a negative shock in another industry in a diversified economy7. Therefore, giving 
up a flexible exchange rate as a mechanism of adjustment has a little cost for a well-diversified 
economy, on the one hand, and on the other hand, benefits from a single currency exceeds this 
cost.  
Kenen (1969) introduces another important criterion in forming an optimum currency area, which 
is fiscal integration. The impact of asymmetric shocks between the two regions can be smoothed 
through the fiscal transfers from a low-unemployment region to a high-unemployment region.  
3.2 The Costs of a Common Currency   
The main cost of a monetary union is related to losing the power of national monetary policy. 
When a country joins a common currency, firstly, it has to stop using its national currency and 
secondly, its national central bank has no real power to conduct a national monetary policy. The 
later means that once a country enters a monetary union, it has no authority anymore to change its 
short term interest rate or price of its currency.8 The advantage is the usefulness and effectiveness 
of these independent national policies, which are vanished by joining a monetary union. In fact, 
there are many situations in which these policies are the only choice to bring back the equilibrium 
which has been gone by some negative shocks. For instance, the helpfulness of the flexible 
exchange rate as an independent national policy, derive from the fact that countries are different 
                                                 
6 By depreciation of the exchange rate, now exporter gets more domestic currency for every unit of foreign currency 
and consequently export revenues improves. 
7  However, there should be occupational mobility between industries within region. 
8 When the country is not able to change the price of its currency, it is meant here that the country cannot devalue or 
revalue its currency. 
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in some significant senses in which this policy can do the best (Horvath and Komárek 2002). The 
three subsequent sections describe some of these differences in details in which applying the 
flexible exchange rate is necessary. 
3.2.1 Shifts in Demand 
There are two scenarios that have to be considered. The first one is about trade between two 
countries named A and B from a monetary union so using a common currency. And the second 
one is about trade between these two countries with their national currency. 
Firstly, in the example of countries A and B once they are facing with demand and supply shock, 
labour mobility and wage flexibility are two mechanisms of adjustment. Therefore, the 
adjustment problem will vanish if these two mechanisms prevail between countries A and B in a 
monetary union. But what will happen if labour mobility and wage flexibility are not sufficiently 
high between countries A and B, which are two members of a monetary union? In this situation, 
in order to adjust to the disequilibrium, inflationary pressure is exposed to country B, which is in 
fact, the cost of joining a monetary union. On the one hand, there is no reduction of wages in A 
and also unemployment workers do not move from country A to country B. On the other hand, 
there is excessive demand for labour in B, which pushes the supply curve upward. This is 
because workers demand an increase in their wage rate.  Thus, in B, prices increase and it in turn 
makes A’s product more competitive. By that, demand for A’s product increases and 
consequently aggregate demand curve in A shifts upward. As a result of labour immobility and 
wages inflexibility, adjustment to the disequilibrium took the form of inflation in B. 
Secondly, there are some other adjustment mechanisms to deal with asymmetric shocks when 
two countries are not joining a common currency. This scenario explains the effectiveness of the 
national monetary policy.  Considering the example of country A and B in which each country 
has its own national currency, the problem of asymmetric shocks will be solved by two 
mechanisms of adjustment derived from the national monetary policy. The first is related to the 
flexible exchange rate by which countries can manipulate their domestic interest rate.  In this 
example, country A can lower its interest rate and so encouraging aggregate demand and country 
B can do the inverse. These mechanisms, which are applied by countries A and B, probably lead 
to depreciation of country A’s currency and appreciation of country B’s currency.  By this 
method, A-made products will be sold in country B cheaper.  
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The second is that countries A and B peg their exchange rate to another currency. In this 
situation, asymmetric shocks will be vanished if country A devaluates its currency against the 
currency of country B; hence the same effect on aggregate demand would be attained. Figure 3.3 
shows the effect of independent monetary policy on aggregate demand. 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3.3 Effects of a devaluation of country A's currency, retrieved from (De Grauwe 2007). 
 
Therefore, if there is not sufficient level of wage flexibility and labour mobility between 
countries in a monetary union, coming back to the equilibrium will be more costly than when the 
countries use their national monetary policy (De Grauwe 2007).  
3.2.2 Different Preferences of Countries about Inflation and Unemployment  
Countries in a monetary union are sensitive to inflation by different levels. This might make the 
common currency costly. Considering different preferences of two countries about inflation and 
unemployment in a monetary union, two countries may choose two different points on their 
Phillips curve. Hence, inflation will be different in the two countries and as a result, a fixed 
exchange rate will not be sustainable. The cost of a monetary union increases here, which derives 
from the fact that these two countries have to choose another point on their Phillips curve if they 
want to keep exchange rate fixed. In other words, they have to choose a less preferred point on 
their Phillips curve to keep inflation rate in an equal level. In this procedure, one country has to 
accept more inflation and less unemployment and the other country has to accept less inflation 
and more unemployment. None of these conditions are in their interest while they have to accept 
them and also accept costs derived from them so as to keep their exchange rate fixed (Ruprah and 
Luengas 2011).    
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3.2.3  Differences in Labour Market Institution 
The degree of centralization of labour market institutions in different countries is not similar. In 
some countries, there is a high degree of centralization and others are less centralized. Under 
these differences, Wage and price reactions will be affected. It in turn may lead to a costly 
monetary union. If wage bargaining is strongly centralized, there is no incentive for unions to 
increase the wage of their members when they face supply shock. In countries in which labour 
unions are less centralized the approach is quite different. In these countries, each union has a 
tendency to increase the wage of its members since the union knows that all other unions do so 
even if it does not so. Thus, if individual union does not claim for wage increasing, the real wage 
of its members would decline. As a result, there will be different inflation rates when a monetary 
union is composed of countries with different degrees of centralization of labour market 
institution. This leads to have a costly monetary union (Grabner 2003).  
3.2.4 Differences in Growth Rate 
Some countries experience higher growth rate than other countries. Different growth rate in 
countries from a monetary union leads to a costly problem. It is explained by the example of 
country A and country B. Suppose that the GDP growth rate for country A is 5% and is 3% for 
country B. Also, assume country A imports from country B at income elasticity equal one and 
income elasticity of country B’s import from A is one. In this situation, country A, which grows 
faster in terms of GDP, will have a balanced problem. This problem is resulted from the fact that 
country A’s import grows faster than its export. To deal with this deficit, county A will have to 
reduce the price of its goods which is exported to B to make them more competitive and thus to 
able to sell them to country B. Hence, a monetary union can be costly for the fast growing 
countries (De Grauwe 2007).  
3.2.5 The Cost of Monetary Union and the Degree of Openness 
The effect of the degree of openness on the cost of a monetary union is analysed via the 
effectiveness of the exchange rate when asymmetric shocks appear. This analysis is performed by 
comparing two independent economies, one relatively open and the other one relatively closed.  
The relatively open economy is affected stronger than the relatively closed economy by the same 
depreciation since the exports of the open economy is higher than the exports of the closed 
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economy. In fact, by the same depreciation the aggregate demand is raised more in the former 
than in the latter. At the same time, the imports of the relatively open economy are more than the 
imports of the relatively closed economy. So, the CPI9 is increased more in the open economy by 
the same depreciation. This in turn makes workers to request additional wage and shifts upward 
supply curve more in the open economy than in the relatively closed economy. It can be 
concluded that the aggregate price level in an open economy is affected more strongly than in a 
relatively closed economy by the same depreciation.  
Therefore, the national monetary policy is likely to be more costly in an open economy than in a 
(relatively) closed economy (Benigno and Benigno 2003; Grabner 2003). 
 
Figure 3.4 Relation between the cost of a monetary union and the openness of a country – 
retrieved from (De Grauwe 2007) 
 
When the degree of openness of a country increases, the cost of a monetary union decreases. This 
relation is shown in Figure 3.4. 
3.3 The Benefits of a Common Currency  
Economic efficiency can be a result of joining a common currency since the national currencies 
are removed. Indeed, a multitude of national currencies are merged into a single one. Therefore, 
due to the reduction in transaction costs, efficiency gains will be improved (Grabner 2003).   
                                                 
9 An index of the cost of all goods and services to a typical consumer 
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3.3.1 Direct and Indirect Gains from the Elimination of Transactional Cost 
One of the most obvious and direct gains from joining a common currency is the elimination of 
transaction costs. Two different forms of transaction costs are such as fixed commission or 
spread between the buying and the selling prices of any given currencies. Elimination of 
transaction cost has also an indirect gain: price transparency. On the one hand, a simple platform 
for price comparison is created by price transparency and on the other hand, price transparency 
causes an increase in competition, so that the consumer will benefit from the same lower prices 
(Monnet).  
3.3.2 Welfare Gains from Less Uncertainty 
Uncertainty about future revenues of the firms in a fixed exchange rate regime is less than in a 
flexible exchange rate regime. In other words, one of the main reasons of uncertainty about future 
revenues of a firm is uncertainty about exchange rate. In addition, the world population is 
composed of risk-averse individual who prefer a certain level of future revenue. Put another way, 
just, if they are promised that the more risky return will be higher than the less risky return, then 
they accept   that (De Grauwe 2007).  
3.3.3 Benefits of an International Currency 
Using a common currency in a monetary union has three sources of benefits. The first source of 
benefits deals with the additional benefits of an international currency. In fact, the issuer of a 
currency obtains additional benefits when the currency in question is used internationally. The 
second source of benefits derives from the fact that foreign central banks hold an international 
currency as an international reserve. However this kind of reserve is held as treasury securities 
and not in the form of cash. By the third benefit, it is concluded that activities by domestic 
financial markets are improved when they work under an international currency. This is because 
of interests of foreign residents to invest in asset and issue debt in that international currency. 
Therefore, bond and equity markets and also businesses are attracted by domestic banks and 
consequently some new jobs are performed (Grabner 2003).  
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3.3.4 Benefits of a Monetary Union and the Openness of Countries 
There is a relationship between benefits of a monetary union and the openness of a country. The 
higher the degree of openness of an economy in a monetary union, the higher welfare gains of 
this monetary union. The elimination of transaction cost is more important in countries where a 
large proportion of goods and services are traded. The likelihood of making an inappropriate 
decision in these countries is high. The reason is that firms and consumers in these countries are 
facing different markets and hence different currencies. So in the process of transaction domestic 
currency to foreign currencies they will lose a proportion of their benefits of their trade. 
Eliminating these risks in small and open countries causes a larger welfare gains in compare to 
the large and relatively closed countries. The relationship between the benefits of a monetary 
union and the openness of the countries is represented in Figure 3.5. By this relationship, welfare 
gains from a monetary union increases when openness toward the other partners in the union 
increases (De Grauwe 2007).  
 
Figure 3.5 Relation between degree of openness (trade) and benefits of a monetary union – 
retrieved from (De Grauwe 2007) 
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3.4 Comparison of Costs and Benefits of a Monetary Union 
Benefits and costs related to the openness of a country were analysed separately in previous 
sections. The combination of these relations is analysed in Figure 3.6.  
 
Figure 3.6 Costs and benefits analysis of a monetary union – retrieved from (De Grauwe 2007) 
 
Figure 3.6 illustrates that the critical level of openness is determined by the intersection point of 
the benefit and cost lines. In fact, this point guides countries whether join a monetary union or 
not. To the left of this point the costs of a monetary union are more than the benefits of a 
monetary union. Hence, in this side, it is better to use the national monetary policy. To the right 
of this point the benefits of a monetary union are more than the costs of a monetary union. 
Therefore, in this area, joining a monetary union could be a better choice than keeping the 
national monetary policy like exchange rate policies. Figure 3.6 shows a general form of a cost-
benefit analysis of a monetary union (De Grauwe 2007). 
 
3.5 The Endogenous Optimum Currency Areas Theory 
The theory of endogeneity of Optimum Currency Areas was pioneered by Frankel and Rose 
(1998). They showed that reciprocal trade is improved significantly by monetary integration. 
Between the members of a potential OCA, four inter relationships are studied by much of 
literatures in the subject of optimum currency area theory (Frankel and Rose 1998):  
1) The degree of trade;  
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2) Synchronisation of shocks and cycles;  
3) The degree of mobility of labour; and  
4) The system of risk sharing10 .  
A common currency will be more attractive and suitable if any of these four linkages will be 
greater between the potential members. For instance, these four criteria were examined by 
researchers so as to determine the suitability of the entrance of a country into the European 
Monetary Union (EMU). But in the sense of Frankel & Rose this procedure is untenable since the 
OCA criteria are endogenous. Frankel and Rose (1998) argue on the first two criteria although 
they do not deny the importance of the third and fourth criteria.  
The nature of national business cycles might be affected by tighter international trade ties. Warin, 
Wunnava et al. (2008) stated that ‘waiting for two economies to be in phase before adopting the 
same currency is only one part of the path towards an OCA since using a common currency will 
also force the economies to become an OCA’. Frankel and Rose (1998) mentioned that ‘a naive 
examination of historical data gives a misleading picture of a country’s suitability for entry to a 
currency union, since the OCA criteria are endogenous’. In fact, a monetary union itself may 
contribute to an additional enhance to trade integration and consequently business cycle 
synchronisation.  
There are two different interpretations about the effect of closer international trade on 
correlations of national business cycles. The first interpretation, known as ‘pro-synchronisation’ 
hypothesis, claims that the deeper the monetary integration process, the more co-movement 
(correlation) in the national business cycles. This co-movement of national business cycles is 
strengthened especially in the case of intra-industry trade. According to the second interpretation, 
co-movement between the outputs of countries in a monetary union decrease with monetary 
integration. This interpretation is called ‘anti synchronisation’. This hypothesis suggests that 
specialization can be expected to happen when inter-industry trade prevail. By ‘pro-
synchronisation’ hypothesis, it is concluded that a positive correlation between members’ output 
is fostered by integration. This in turn leads to more synchronisation of business cycles. The 
                                                 
10 Often, risk sharing is done by fiscal transfers.  
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reasons for this claim are based on the four microeconomic conditions which are necessary to 
form an OCA (Akiba and Iida 2009):   
1) Decline of transaction cost 
Chaplygin, Hallett et al. (2006) state that “a necessary and sufficient condition for low 
costs is both a high positive correlation between the shocks..., and shocks of similar size.”  
2) Allocation of scarce resources will be more efficient  
3) Creating more opportunities in financial market integration and hence a boost in capital 
mobility. 
4) Real exchange rate volatility is decreased in the result of more flexibility in wage and 
prices. 
All of these four argumentations can be expected to contribute to improve trade and more 
integration and symmetry of outputs. Pursuant to ‘pro-synchronisation’ hypothesis, member 
countries may satisfy the OCA properties ex post, even though they may fail to satisfy them ex 
ante. This hypothesis is called ‘endogeneity of OCA hypotheses’ by Mongelli and Europeo 
(2002).  
The latter hypothesis, ‘anti synchronisation’, was discussed by Krugman (1993). He claims that 
reciprocal volume of trade between countries increases as a result of more integration. Therefore, 
a necessary condition, openness, for forming an OCA is satisfied. Exporting countries will be 
specialised in production for which they have a comparative advantage due to the raise in 
openness. Specialization, in turn undermines ‘diversification’, the necessary condition for the 
OCA. Hence, in Krugman’s words, countries in a monetary union will be more exposed to 
asymmetric shocks for the reason that the correlation coefficient of output has a tendency to fall. 
Mongelli and Europeo (2002) called this hypothesis the ‘Krugman specialization hypothesis’. 
The high correlation coefficients between outputs of countries are important since within a 
monetary union, independent monetary policy, which is applied to deal with asymmetric shocks, 
must be removed. The cost, which is resulted from abandoning independent monetary policy, is 
lowered if output co-move among the member countries. By co-movement of output it is meant 
here that the correlation coefficient is high (Akiba and Iida 2009).    
Frankel and Rose (1998) believe the ‘pro-synchronisation’ hypothesis to be the more realistic 
one. They wrote: ‘only countries whose business cycles are imperfectly synchronised with 
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others’ could benefit from the potential stabilisation afforded by a national monetary policy’. As 
mentioned so far, the relation between the extent of trade among members of a potential common 
currency and the correlation of incomes is discussed by endogeneity of OCA theory by Frankel 
and Rose (1998). This argumentation also is discussed by De Grauwe, Mongelli et al. (2005) 
Figure 3.7 gives a better understanding of endogeneity of OCA theory. Vertical axis shows 
correlation of business cycles across countries, i.e. income correlation. Income correlation means 
that the shocks exposed to the economies are symmetric. Horizontal axis shows the extent of 
international trade.  
 
Figure 3.7 Income correlation, integration and OCA line-retrieved from (Frankel and Rose 1998) 
 
The OCA line indicates that sharing a single currency is beneficial for countries which share a 
high level of either openness or income correlation among them (Frankel and Rose 1998).  
The OCA line in this representation is downward-sloping. De Grauwe, Mongelli et al. (2005) 
mentioned the reason for the shape of OCA line. On the one hand, the costs of a monetary union 
are increased if symmetry is decreased. This is because losing of national monetary policy 
instrument is more costly while the degree of asymmetry increases. On the other hand, as the 
degree of integration increases member countries benefit more from the monetary union, i.e. 
benefits from efficiency gains. Therefore, integration can be considered as a source of benefits of 
a monetary union. As a result, the costs originated from more asymmetry can be compensated by 
the benefits generated from more integration. Frankel and Rose (1998) explained the reason for 
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the shape of OCA line as: ‘the advantages of adopting a common currency depend positively on 
both trade integration and the degree to which business cycles are correlated internationally’. 
Each point on the OCA line represents a combination of certain level of symmetry and a certain 
level of integration. Costs and benefits of a monetary union balance for all points on the OCA 
line. Points high up and to the right of the OCA line indicate groups of countries which have 
found it beneficial to join a monetary union. In other words, benefits of a monetary union 
outweigh its cost for groups of countries to the right of the OCA line. To the left of the OCA line 
the benefits from independent national monetary policy overcome the efficiency gains from the 
monetary union. There is a disagreement regarding the direction in which income correlation 
moves along the OCA line when openness increases. This debate is represented by Figure 3.8. In 
one case, income correlation increases as openness increases. Therefore, the union moves along 
the upward arrow (shown by arrows number one). In another case, income correlation decreases 
as openness increases and consequently the union moves along the downwards sloping arrow 
(shown by arrow number two)11 (De Grauwe, Mongelli et al. 2005).  
 
                                                 
11 These two views have been mentioned previously. The former is in fact European commission view and the latter 
is Krugman’s view.   
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Figure 3.8 Direction of movement of a union related to relation between income correlation and 
openness-retrieved from (De Grauwe, Mongelli et al. 2005) 
 
In the latter case, which is also called specialisation, increased openness has the opposite effect 
on income correlation. Therefore, in the sense of De Grauwe, Mongelli et al. (2005), another 
significant dimension, flexibility, should be taken into account so as to judge the merit of 
monetary union. They showed the trade-off between income correlation and flexibility by the 
downward sloping OCA line. Figure 3.9 shows this relationship for a given level of integration. 
The argumentation for the relation between income correlation and flexibility is similar to the 
argumentation about the relation between income correlation and openness. Each point on the 
OCA line represents a combination of certain level of symmetry and a certain level of flexibility. 
For all points on the OCA line, costs and benefits of a monetary union are balanced. The OCA 
line in this representation is downward sloping. While the degree of symmetry decreases, the cost 
of the monetary union increases. Thus, there should be an increase in flexibility (as a source of 
benefits of a monetary union), so as to compensate the cost originated from less symmetry.   
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Figure 3.9 Income correlation, flexibility and OCA line-retrieved from (De Grauwe, Mongelli et 
al. 2005) 
Considering the relationship between income correlation, degree of openness (integration) and 
flexibility, in Figure 3.10, the OCA line is drawn for a given level of integration. In Figure 3.10, 
the relationship between income correlation and flexibility is investigated by different levels of 
integration. The OCA line (composed of points which are combination of certain level of income 
correlation and flexibility) shifts downward as a result of a boost in integration. In fact, benefits 
of a union rise as a consequence of increased integration, so that the need for flexibility and 
symmetry in order to making a monetary union beneficial is decreased. Figure 3.10 shows that 
for a higher level of integration (I2>I1), the OCA line shifts downward. Consequently, for a 
certain level of symmetry (S) we need less flexibility (F2) to make a monetary union beneficial. 
Similarly, for a certain level of flexibility (F) we need less symmetry (S2) to make a monetary 
union beneficial. De Grauwe, Mongelli et al. (2005) formulate these relations by a linear 
mathematical. In their sense, the net benefits of a monetary union are a positive function of: 
1. The degree of flexibility 
2. The degree of symmetry 
3. The degree of integration 
The linear equation can be considered as below: 
B=f+I+s 
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Figure 3.10 OCA line as a combination of   income correlation and flexibility relative to different 
levels of integration -retrieved from (De Grauwe, Mongelli et al. 2005) 
3.6 Gravity Model of Trade 
The law of gravity in the 17th century was formulated by Newton stating that the attraction 
between two bodies is affected positively by the product of masses of two bodies and negatively 
by the distance between these two bodies (Djabir 2009). 
Law of universal gravitation formulated by Newton (Head 2003): 
2
ij
ji
ij D
YY
GM
           (1)  
Where:  
• Mij is the attractive force. 
• Yi and Yj are the masses. 
• Dij is the distance between the two objects. 
• G is a gravitational constant depending on the units of measurement for mass and force.  
In economics, Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) introduced the gravity model to study the 
bilateral trade flows. Since then, the gravity model is known as a popular instrument in the 
empirical international trade analysis.  
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 Indeed, flows of international trade are explained widely by using this model. In the context of 
international trade, physical bodies refer to exporting and importing countries (bilateral trade 
partners) and the size of economies of these partners are masses. The gravity model of 
international trade claims that trade flows between two economies depend positively on the size 
of these economies (their national income) and negatively on the distance between two 
economies. Distance serves as a proxy for the degree of resistance between two countries, which 
increases transportation costs (Djabir 2009).  In other words, one of the most stable relationships 
in economics is described by the gravity model. Brakman and Bergeijk (2010) state: “interactions 
between large economic clusters are stronger than between smaller ones, and nearby clusters 
attract each other more than far-off ones.” 
The same functional form to the law of Newton applicable to the international trade flows was 
proposed by Tinbergen (1962):  


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      (2) 
Where:  
• Xij is considered as the “flow” from home country i to the destination country j 
• Yi and Yj are the relevant economic sizes of the two locations. These variables could be 
gross domestic product (GDP) of each location If X is measured as a monetary flow (e.g. 
exports values). 
• Dij is the distance between the locations (usually measured centre to centre). By returning 
to Newton’s law if α = β = 1 then ө = 2.                                                                                                        
 
3.6.1 Economic Explanations for Gravity 
The gravity model could be considered as a sort of short-hand representation of supply and 
demand forces. Consider country i as the home country and then Yi represents the amount it is 
willing to supply. Meantime, suppose Yj be the amount of income country j spends on all goods 
from any source i. In addition, Distance is considered as a kind of tax which increases trade costs.  
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Finally, suppose sij be the share of Yj that gets spent on goods from country i. By all of these 
parameters, an equation will be obtained as below:   
jijij YsX      (3) 
On the one hand, Sij depends positively on a wide variety (ni) and high quality (µi) in products of 
country i. On the other hand, trade barriers such as distance decreases Sij. However this variable 
is between 0 and 1 (Head 2003). Sij is derived from the following relation: 
  
l
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     (4) 
There are different approaches about the specific form of g(.). One approach by Bergstrand 
(1985) assumes µi= 1 and makes ni proportional to Yi. There is a second approach by Anderson 
(1979) who assumes each country produces a single good (ni=1), but lets the preference 
parameter µi vary in such a way as to also be proportional to Yi. However, both approaches 
assume that trade costs is a power function of the distance. Thus, equation 5 specifies the form of 
sij:  
RjDYS ijiij         (5)  
Such that: 
 
l
ljll DngRj ,,1            (6) 
Now by substituting equation (5) into the equation (3), equation (7) is obtained which is very 
close to application of gravity model in trade, (i.e. equation (2) proposed by Tinbergen (1962) ) 
(Head 2003). 

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3.6.2 Mathematical and Economic form of the Gravity Model 
The mathematical form of the gravity model in its most basic interpretation (also another form of 
the equation (2)) is expressed as(Zarzoso ; Djabir 2009): 
ijijjijiij DNNYYX    543210          (8) 
Where: 
- Xij is the value of bilateral trade between countries i and j. 
- Yi and Yj are the national income of country i and country j respectively. 
- Ni and Nj are the population of countries i and country j respectively. 
- Dij represents the geographic distance between two countries i and j. 
- εij represent any other factors (which are not included in the model) facilitating or 
preventing trade between two countries i and j.  
β1, β2, β3, β4, and β5 are exponents indicating that the relations between the explanatory 
variables and the trade flows may not be necessarily linear or directly proportional. 
In most of the literature, the variable population is replaced by GDP per capita. However, 
equation (8) should be estimated economically. Hence, it has to be expressed in log-linear form: 
 
h
ijijhhijjijiij PDNNYYX  lnlnlnlnlnln 543210
   
(9) 
Ln in this model indicates variables in natural logs. Pijh is a dummy variable that takes one for 
value, if a certain condition is satisfied, and zero otherwise. In fact, dummy variables reflect the 
effect of particular conditions on the bilateral trade. Bilateral trade is increased when the 
coefficient of a dummy variable is positive and significant comparing to a situation in which 
these conditions do not exist. Dummy variables could be such as sharing a common border or 
common language between two trading partners as well as membership in a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) or customs union. Different literatures have used different dummy variables. 
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Dummy variables in our work are common border, common language and common colonizer at 
any time between two partners.  
We expect a positive sign for β1and β2. On the one hand, a result of high level of income in the 
exporting country is a high level of production. In addition, it in turn indicates the availability of 
goods for exports. On the other hand, higher imports are a result of a high level of income in the 
importing country. The expected sign for the coefficient of the population in exporting and 
importing countries are ambiguous. It depends on whether the country exports less when it is big 
or whether a big country exports more than a small country (Zarzoso). 
Equation (9) is considered as a very basic gravity model. Variables in this equation are coming 
from the works of Kalirajan (1999), Endoh (1999), Breuss and Egger (1999), Nitsch (2000), 
Buch and Piazolo (2001), Porojan (2001), Sapir (2001), Soloaga and Alan Wintersb (2001), 
Glick and Rose (2002), Kurihara (2003), Gopinath and Echeverria (2004), Roberts (2004), Sohn 
(2005), Peridy (2005), Tang (2005), Carrere (2006), Fratianni and Kang (2006), Elliott (2007), 
Kalirajan (2007), Bun and Klaassen (2007), Tzouvelekas (2007), Melitz (2007) There are many 
other independent variables promoting or hampering trade among economies. Some of these 
variables were categorized by Brülhart and Kelly (1999): 
 Variables that describe the potential supply of the exporting country include income and 
income per capita and population of the exporting country; 
 Variables that describe the potential demand of the importing country include income and 
income per capita and population of the importing country; 
 Variables that describe the resistance to trade include geographical distance, policy and 
cultural barrier to trade, etc. 
A number of these variables are entered into the gravity model by different studies.  
Kandogan (2008) has added foreign currency reserves, similarity in economic size and relative 
factor endowment (Hecksher Ohlin variables). Also, relative factor endowment has been added 
by Antonucci and Manzocchi (2006). One of the most complete forms of gravity model was 
presented by Warin, Wunnava et al. (2009) in investigating the Southern African Economic 
Integration. They added monetary and fiscal variables including inflation, public deficit, public 
expenditure, and public debt to the gravity model of trade. This study aims to apply a gravity 
model with a complete set of explanatory variables that are used in different other studies. Except 
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empirical justification for gravity model, theoretical foundations of this model also were justified 
by several studies, which are presented in the next section. 
3.6.3 Theoretical Foundations of the Gravity Equation 
In fact, the gravity equation started by  is considered as a purely empirical contribution to 
explaining bilateral trade flows (Tinbergen 1962; Pöyhönen 1963). By purely empirical, it is 
meant that at that time there was no theoretical foundation to explain the gravity model in 
international trade. More variables were added to the equation by Linnemann (1966) such that he 
went further toward a theoretical justification. Since the late 1970s, the gravity equation obtained 
more legitimacy by a series of theoretical articles. In fact, these theoretical articles indicated the 
consistency of the gravity equation with various models of trade flows. Leamer and Stern (1970) 
by following work of Savage and Deutsch (1960) derived the gravity equation in the form of a 
probability model of transactions. Anderson (1979) followed the contributions to derive the 
gravity equation with the assumption of product differentiation first by assuming Cobb-Douglas 
preferences and then, constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES)12 preferences. Also, Bergstrand 
(1985) used CES preferences to derive a reduced form equation for bilateral trade involving price 
indexes. 
Helpman (1987) based on his work with Krugman and Helpman (1985), presents a model in the 
form of the gravity equation in which, intra industry trade is addressed directly. In his model he 
indicates that trade volume within a group increases when countries in that group are more 
symmetric in their income. Deardorff (1998) derived the gravity equation from the perspective of 
the Hechsher-Ohlin theory of comparative advantage13. In this theory, the comparative advantage 
of a country is specified by relative resources of the country. Also, in support of the gravity 
equation from the perspective of theoretical foundations, Deardorff (1998) derived two gravity 
equations based on incomplete specialization (Fratianni 2007). van Wincoop and Anderson 
                                                 
12 In economics, Constant elasticity of substitution (CES) is a property of some production functions and utility 
functions. 
13 Theory of comparative advantage indicates that capital-rich countries have a tendency to exports capital-intensive 
products; while labor-rich countries will exports products that require a relative intensive use of the labor.  
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(2003) and Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) have extended the work of Anderson (1979). Behind the 
history of the gravity equation, works by Anderson (1979), van Wincoop and Anderson (2003) 
and Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) are the main references for subsequent works on the gravity 
equation, which is explained in the next section. Thus, despite the lack of theoretical foundations 
for the gravity equation in the sixties and before, this model was legitimated by a series of 
theoretical articles in the seventies.  
The Gravity Equation by Anderson (1979) 
The simplest possible gravity equation was developed by Anderson (1979). To develop his micro 
foundations for the gravity equation, he used a Cobb Douglas expenditure equation with some 
assumptions such as: 
 Complete specialization assumption for each country, means that each country only 
produces one good and is specialized in its own good; 
 There is no tariff or transportation cost; 
 Zero balance of trade is assumed in each period; 
 The fraction of income spent on the country i’s product is the same in all countries; 
 Prices are assumed constant at equilibrium values and units are picked so that they are all 
assumed unity; 
With these assumptions, trade flow from country i to j in each time period t is expressed as: 
jiij YX      Or   jiji YX /       (10) 
Where: 
i : The fraction of income spent on the country i’s product, 
jY : Real GDP in country j (importing country). 
Assumption of equality of income and sales implies that production in country i should be equal 
to the sum of domestic consumption and external consumption (exports). Thus GDP of country i 
can be modeled as:  



 

 N
j
ji
N
j
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N
j
iji YYXY
111
  
         41 
 
Or 
Wi
N
j
jii YYYY 


 
1
         (11) 
Where 


N
j
jW YY
1
represents the real GDP of the world that is constant for each country pair.  
By inserting equation (11) into equation (10), we obtain: 
Wji
N
j
jjiij YYYYYYX 


 


1
   (12) 
Equation (12) is one of the simplest forms of the gravity model by Anderson (1979). The basic 
structure of the gravity model is achieved by taking a natural logarithm of both side of this 
equation: 
ijjiij ZYYX   lnlnln      (13) 
Where )ln( WY , and Zij indicates a vector of variables, which are constant across time (e.g. 
distance or border effect). A more complete form of the gravity equation (rather than equation 
13) is seen in the work of van Wincoop and Anderson (2003) and Baldwin and Taglioni (2006). 
 
Gravity Equation by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)  
Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) represent a simplified derivation of the gravity model in six steps. 
Step 1: The first step is based on the equality of supply and demand, which indicates that the 
value of trade follows from country i to country j should equal the share of country i in 
expenditure of country j: 
jijijij Esxp          (14) 
Where: 
pij indicates the price of import from country i to country j 
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sij indicates the share of country i has in expenditure of country j 
Ej is expenditure of country j 
Step 2: Next, Sij is derived by following a CES demand structure. Assume all goods are traded, 
the share of country i in country j’s expenditure depends on the bilateral prices, pij, relative to a 
price index, Pj.   
   1Pjpijsij     (15)         Such that    

 

  
11
...1
1
Ni
pijniPj  
Where notations are defined as follows: 
σ: elasticity of substitution among varieties (σ > 1) 
N: number of nations, 
ni: number of varieties which is supplied by nation i, 
Step 3: trade costs are added in this step. One of the most important factors in all gravity models 
is the cost of trade. Suppose that tij indicates the costs of bilateral trade between country i and 
country j. Hence, the price in market j is:  
ijiij tpp          (16) 
In this equation pi represents the mill price of a variety in country i. pij is the price in market j 
after transportation. Note that varieties are assumed symmetric and there is no index for them.   
Step 4: total trade between two economies is described by gravity equation which this implies 
aggregation across varieties: 
     11 jjijiijijiij PEtpnEsnT     (17) 
The third part of equation (17) (      11 jjijii PEtpn ) is obtained by inserting equation 
(16) into equation (15) and then inserting the result of this combination into the second part of the 
equation (17) ( jiji Esn  ). 
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Step 5: in this step the budget constraint is taken into account. Since all goods are traded, total 
income of country i, Yi, equals total sales to all destination countries j. Country i itself is 
considered as a destination country since it is also a consumer of i’s products. 
   
j
jjijii
j
iji PEtpnTY
 111
     (18)
 
Second equality in equation (18) is obtained by inserting the right side of equation (17) into the 
second part of equation (18) (
j
ijT ). 
Equation (18) can be written as: 
   1
1
i
ii
Yipn
  (19) 
Where   
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Step 6: gravity equation is derived by inserting equation (19) into equation (17): 
 1)( ji
ij
jiij p
tEYT
    (7) 
Equation (20) is a gravity equation, which was derived by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006). This 
equation is similar to the equation derived by van Wincoop and Anderson (2003). The only 
difference is that van Wincoop and Anderson (2003) used income share instead of expenditure. 
The gravity equation by van Wincoop and Anderson (2003) has the following form: 
   1jiijWjiij ptYYYX
   (21) 
Where: 
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Where notations are defined as: 
Yi, Yj are real GDP in the exporter and importer countries respectively, 
YW is the real GDP of the world, 
tij is the costs of bilateral trade between country i and country j, 
Pj is the consumer price index of j. 
The main difference between equation (21) and the one that was derived by Tinbergen (1962) is 
the price index P and Π, which are called multilateral resistance terms. These terms indicate that 
bilateral trade between two economies except for depending on bilateral variables related to these 
two economies also depends on their position relative to the world economy. 
The gravity equation in this study is based on general form of gravity model in international trade 
in equation (2) in section 3.6 (gravity model of trade).  This equation was extended in this 
research and additional explanatory variables were put in the basic model, such as convergence 
variables, market size, income similarity and relative factor endowment. From the literature 
review, different explanatory variables were put in different regression lines based on different 
gravity equation used in previous researches.   
3.6.4 Two of the Most Important Variables in the Gravity Model 
The key point in the gravity model is that the volume of bilateral trade can be explained by two 
important variables: economic size of two trading partners and distance between them (Feyrer 
2009). 
 Economic size (income) 
High levels of income in the exporting and importing countries indicate respectively: 
 High level of production which in turn indicates the availability of goods for 
exports in exporter country; 
 Higher imports as a result of a high level of income in the importing country. 
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 Distance 
Although, some studies have discussed the “death of distance” many studies using the gravity 
equation of bilateral trade confirm that the impact of geographic distance is still substantial. In 
fact, the main significant characteristic of the gravity model is the concept of bilateral distance 
since volume of trade between countries is affected substantially by distance between them. Put 
differentially, tastes and cultural characteristics may diverge if distance increases between 
countries and consequently, trade decreases between them.  
In natural science, such as physics, the concept of distance is well defined and measurement of 
that is unambiguous and explicit. In the context of economics, however, distance is a multifaceted 
variable and its interpretation and measurement is not as clear as in natural science. The main 
reason of entering distance into the gravity model is that it can be considered as a proxy for 
transportation costs and transport time. Also, it can be counted as a proxy for measuring the 
“mental” distance of exporter and importer. Different studies have used different proxies for 
measuring distance costs in the gravity models. Some researchers rely on the dummy variables to 
measuring the costs of distance such as common borders, language similarities, cultural 
differences, colonial ties, etc. The effect of these variables is explained in the next section. Actual 
data on shipping costs are used by most of other studies to measure the costs of trade in the 
gravity model (Brakman and Bergeijk 2010).  
In this study, the dummy variables were used as well as the distance between two economies in 
kilometre.  
3.6.5 Intangible Barriers to the International Trade 
The effects of intangible trade barriers are another important characteristic, which are explained 
in the gravity model. In this context, the main concern of most of the gravity model studies is 
only the geographical distance. However, there are important additional costs involved in trade 
beside the transportation costs. Deardorff (2004) states that the current amount of global trade 
would be much higher than what it is now, if transportation costs were the only cost involved in 
trade. 
Cultural distances could be considered as the other dimension of distance. Tariffs, search costs 
and information costs about the product and the reliability of trading partners are several kinds of 
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transaction costs, which are stated by Den Butter and Mosch (2003) and Anderson and Van 
Wincoop (2004). In addition, the costs of negotiation increase when two trading partners do not 
have a common language. 
Cultural differences as trade barriers are entered into the gravity equation in the form of dummy 
variables stating whether the trading partners have a common language, common border and/or 
colonial past. A significant positive effect of these variables on the amount of international trade 
was found by most of studies. These variables capture cultural familiarity, meaning that if trading 
partners satisfy the presence of these variables among them, they communicate and share 
information easier since they have more knowledge about the cultures of each other (Brakman 
and Bergeijk 2010). 
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CHAPITRE 4 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
In this section a descriptive analysis is presented to provide a clear picture of our dataset. 
Dependent and independent variables are investigated for each economy relative to the other 
economies through the years. By this investigation, behaviour of exports (i.e. dependent 
variable), and all explanatory variables of each economy as an exporter are investigated by taking 
a trend line of their plot charts. Years are shown in the plot charts by X axis. Each variable is 
shown on the Y axis. For instance, exports for the pair Albania-Algeria is displayed by a plot 
chart in which X axis shows year 1995 to 2010 and Y axis shows exports from Albania to Algeria 
in thousands of US dollars. By taking a trend line of this chart, we can see exports from Albania 
to Algeria through the years. This procedure is done for all pairs relative to the dependent 
variable, exports, and some of the independent variables mentioned in Table 4.1 firstly to give a 
big picture of our dataset, and secondly to find smaller groups of economies that might be good 
candidates for integration. A table will be presented after a brief description for each economy as 
an exporter in which direction of trend line for the investigated variables in Table 4.1 relative to 
all partners of each economy is summarized. In these tables, the variables will be presented by 
numbers. Variables are defined in the Table 4.1 based on these numbers. 
Table 4.1 Definition of variables based on numbers 
1 Common border 
2 Common language 
3 Common colony 
4 Absolute value of difference of GDP growth 
5 Absolute value of difference of interest rate 
6 Absolute value of difference of inflation 
7 Absolute value of difference of budget deficit 
8 Absolute value of difference of government debt 
9 Absolute value of difference of government expenditure 
10 Absolute value of difference of reserves position 
11 Market size 
12 Income similarity 
13 Absolute value of relative difference of factor endowments 
Variables starting with ‘Absolute value of difference of…’ (i.e. variable number 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10 and 13), In Table 4.1, are explained in more details. For instance, consider the variable 
‘Absolute value of difference of GDP growth’ for pair Albania-Algeria. Firstly, it is tried to 
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calculate difference of GDP growth of these two economies for years from 1995 to 2010. 
Secondly, the absolute value of this difference for the given pair is calculated through the years. 
This procedure is performed for all variables relative to all pairs through the mentioned years.  
Pairs that have a descending trend line for explanatory variables include “absolute value of 
difference of GDP growth”, “absolute value of difference of deposit interest rate”, “absolute 
value of difference of budget deficit”, “absolute value of difference of inflation”, “absolute value 
of difference of government debt”, “absolute value of difference of government expenditure”, 
“absolute value of difference of reserve position”, and “absolute value of difference of factor 
endowment” might be good candidates for integration. Descending trend line for these variables 
in a pair of countries shows the convergence and homogeneity of this pair in terms of GDP 
growth, deposit interest rate, budget deficit, inflation, government debt, government expenditure, 
reserve position, and factor endowment. In a pair of countries, ascending trend line for two 
variables “market size” and “income similarity” make them suitable for integration. Moreover, 
historical and cultural ties between economies might make a more stable and durable integration 
between economies. Proxies for historical and cultural ties could be common border, common 
language and common colony at any time period. 
A plot chart also is drawn for dependent variable, export from each economy to its partners. In 
this regard, pairs that have an ascending trend line of exports in their plot charts might be a good 
candidate for integration. 
In the next section, the analysis of the dataset is discussed investigating trend lines of plot charts 
(TLPC) of all variables for each economy as an exporter. In investigating each economy, a table 
will be presented in which the amount of maximum, minimum, and average as well as the sum of 
exports from each economy (exporter) to its partners are highlighted. In addition, figures for the 
amount of exports as well as for the trend line of exports from each economy to the EU will be 
demonstrated as an example. Figures for all other pairs in terms of exports and explanatory 
variables will be presented in appendix section.    
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4.1  Economy, Geography and History of Albania Relative to its 
Partners 
TLPC of exports from Albania to Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey and EU is ascending. 
However, this line is descending for pairs Albania-Algeria and Albania-Croatia. Data on exports 
are not available for partners of Albania such as Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. For 
instance, Figure 4.1 (a) shows the amount of exports from Albania to the EU in thousands of US 
dollar, which minimum and maximum exports are 122935.59 and 1058729.70 in year 1997 and 
2010 respectively. Moreover, Figure 4.1 (b) represents the linear trend line of exports from 
Albania to the EU, which is ascending through the years. Figures of all other partners of Albania 
in terms of exports can be seen in appendix XI. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 (a) Exports from Albania to EU; (b) trend line of exports from Albania to EU 
 
Table 4.2 represents a brief summary of this information for all pairs originated from Albania. 
From this table and based on average and sum of exports, the main partners of Albania are the 
European Union, and Turkey as well as Croatia. However, relation of Albania and Algeria in 
terms of exports is the weakest partnership in this group. 
About the variable distance, Croatia (585 km) is the closest country to Albania while Mauritania 
is the farthest (4264 km). Among all partners, Albania has a common border with EU and a 
common colony with Turkey. Albania has a common language with none of its partners. Table 
4.3 shows the relationship between Albania and all of its partners in terms of explanatory 
variables. 
 
b a 
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Table 4.2 Exports from Albania to its partners 
 
Exports from 
Albania to 
Max/Year Min/Year Average Sum 
Algeria 62.08/2004 5.47/2007 29.34 117.35 
Croatia 5780.02/1997 49.72/2001 1365.90 19122.67 
Egypt 5324.99/2010 2.23/2003 845.61 7610.51 
Israel 868.32/2006 2.542008 215.87 2158.71 
Jordan 765.65/2009 17.87/2008 259.37 1296.87 
Lebanon No data available  No data available  No data available  No data available 
Mauritania No data available No data available No data available No data available 
Morocco No data available No data available No data available No data available 
Syria 153.83/2007 12.38/2004 78.23 547.61 
Tunisia No data available No data available No data available No data available 
Turkey 92656.313/2010 1098.59/1999 13588.53 203828.01 
EU 1058729.70/2010 122935.59/1997 526784.67 7901770.09 
 
The TLPC of the variable “absolute value of difference of GDP growth” is descending for most 
partners of Albania. However, this line is ascending for Mauritania. By descending it is meant 
here that GDP growth of two economies become converge through the years and ascending 
means that this  variable for two economies through the years become diverge. The TLPC of the 
variable “absolute value of difference of GDP growth” for all pairs is demonstrated in appendix I. 
The TLPC of the variable “absolute value of difference of interest rate” is descending for all 
partners of Albania except for pair Albania-Tunisia which data on this pair is not available. The 
TLPC of the variable “absolute value of difference of interest rate” for all pairs is demonstrated 
in appendix II 
Concerning the variable “absolute value of difference of inflation”, the TLPC of this variable is 
ascending for Mauritania and descending for the other partners of Albania while the data are not 
available on this variable for the pair Albania-Syria. The Descending trend line of this variable 
for most partners of Albania means that in the sense of inflation, Albania becomes similar to the 
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other economies through the years. The TLPC of the variable “absolute value of difference of 
inflation” for all pairs is demonstrated in appendix III. 
The data on variable “absolute value of difference of budget deficit” are not available for partners 
of Albania such as Algeria, Mauritania, Syria, and Turkey. For all the other partners, the TLPC of 
this variable is descending. The TLPC of the variable “absolute value of difference of budget 
deficit” for all pairs is demonstrated in appendix IV. 
The TLPC of the variable “Absolute value of difference of government debt” is descending for 
most partners of Albania except for Algeria, Israel, and Tunisia. Hence, this similarity of Albania 
to most of its partners helps to satisfy the condition of the Treaty of Maastricht. The TLPC of the 
variable “Absolute value of difference of government debt” for all pairs is demonstrated in 
appendix V. 
The absolute value of difference of government expenditure decreases for majority partners of 
Albania through the years. However, the trend line of this variable is ascending for partners of 
Albania such as Algeria, Jordan, Mauritania, and the EU. The TLPC of the variable “Absolute 
value of difference of government expenditure” for all pairs is demonstrated in appendix VI. 
Regarding the reserve position, Albania becomes similar to economies such as Croatia, Egypt, 
and Tunisia through the years. However, the absolute value of difference of reserves position 
between Albania and its other partners increases through the years. the TLPC of the variable 
“Absolute value of difference of reserve position” for all pairs is demonstrated in appendix VII. 
Among the Hecksher-Ohlin variables, the TLPC of market size for all pairs originated from 
Albania is ascending. In addition, income similarity increases through the years for all partners of 
Albania except for Mauritania. The TLPC for relative difference between pairs originated from 
Albania in terms of relative factor endowments is descending for majority partners of Albania. 
However, this line is ascending for Egypt, Mauritania, and Syria. The TLPC of the variables 
“Market size”, “Income similarity” and “Absolute value of difference of factor endowments” for 
all pairs are demonstrated in appendix VIII, IX and IXX respectively. 
As an example, the TLPC of all explanatory variables for the pair Albania-EU are shown in 
Figure 4.2, including (a) absolute value of difference GDP growth, (b) absolute value of 
difference of interest rate, (c) absolute value of difference of inflation, (d) absolute value of 
difference of budget deficit, (e) absolute value of difference of government debt, (f) absolute 
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value of difference government expenditure, (g) absolute value of difference of reserves position, 
(h) market size, (j) income similarity and (j) absolute value of difference of factor endowment. 
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Figure 4.2 TPLC of all explanatory variables for the pair Albania-EU 
 
Table 4.3 demonstrates a summary for all partners of Albania in our sample with regard to all 
explanatory variables. Cells in green colour indicate suitability of integration between Albania 
and the other partners in terms of certain variables. Letter A, D and S indicate that trend line is 
ascending, descending and straight respectively. Cells shown by ND indicate unavailability of 
data.   
Table 4.3 Status of all pairs originated from Albania relative to explanatory variables 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Algeria NO NO NO D D D ND A A A A A D 
Croatia NO NO NO D D D D D D D A A D 
Egypt NO NO NO D D D D D D D A A A 
Israel NO NO NO D D D D A D A A A D 
Jordan NO NO NO D D D D D A A A A D 
Lebanon NO NO NO D D D D D D A A A D 
Mauritania NO NO NO A D A ND D A A A D A 
Morocco NO NO NO D D D D D D A A A D 
Syria NO NO NO D D ND ND D D A A A A 
Tunisia NO NO NO D ND D D A D D A A D 
Turkey NO NO YES D D D ND D D A A A D 
EU YES NO NO D D D D D A A A A D 
i j 
Variable 
Partner 
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4.2 Economy, Geography and History of Algeria Relative to its 
Partners 
The TLPC of exports from Algeria to most of its partners is ascending. However, this line is 
descending for Croatia and Mauritania. In addition, data on exports for the pair Algeria-Israel are 
not available. For instance, Figure 4.3 (a) shows amount of exports from Algeria to EU in 
thousands of US dollar which minimum and maximum exports are 5853041.54 and 41407429.21 
in the years 1995 and 2008 respectively. Figure 4.3 (b) represents linear trend line of exports 
from Algeria to EU which is ascending through the years. Figures of all the other partners of 
Algeria in terms of exports can be seen in appendix XII. 
 
  
 
Figure 4.3 (a) Exports from Algeria to EU; (b) trend line of exports from Algeria to EU 
 
Table 4.4 represents a brief summary of this information for all pairs originated from Algeria. 
Noticing the sum and average exports, the main partners of Algeria are European Union, Turkey 
as well as Tunisia and Morocco. In addition, the relationship of Algeria and Albania in terms of 
exports can be seen as the weakest partnership in this group. However, data on exports from 
Algeria to Israel are not available.   
  
a b
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Table 4.4 Exports from Algeria to its partners 
Exports 
from 
Algeria to 
Max/year Min/Year Average Sum 
Albania 2150.60/2007 15.40/1998 696.28 666.49 
Croatia 24276.32/2002 0.74/2004 4714.99 75439.87 
Egypt 606899.35/2008 1715.08/1999 249244.03 3987904.51 
Israel No data available No data available No data available No data available 
Jordan 24695.83/2010 168.49/2000 8754.41 140070.51 
Lebanon 28337.66/2010 155.80/2004 9026.94 144430.97 
Mauritania 52035.44/1997 149.22/2005 15055.80 240892.88 
Morocco 713200.68/2010 59620.72/1998 275891.63 4414266.01 
Syria 74336.53/2010 3.25/1998 15551.57 233273.56 
Tunisia 859068.28/2008 32883.68/1998 186974.18 2991586.84 
Turkey 2919721.1/2008 314394.11/1995 1362868.88 21805902.01 
EU 41407429.21/2008 5853041.54/1995 17375619.95 278009919.2 
 
In the sense of distance, Tunisia and Jordan are the closest (642 km) and farthest (3057 km) 
countries to Algeria respectively. Among all partners Algeria has a common border with 
Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia as well as a common language with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. 
Table 4.5 demonstrates a brief summary for all partners of Algeria in this research sample with 
regard to all the explanatory variables. Cells in green colour indicate suitability of integration 
between Algeria and other partners in terms of certain variables. 
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Table 4.5 Status of all pairs originated from Algeria relative to explanatory variables 
    
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Albania NO NO NO D D D ND A A A A A D 
Croatia NO NO NO A D S A A D A A D A 
Egypt NO YES NO A A D A A A A A A A 
Israel NO YES NO D D A D A D A A A D 
Jordan NO YES NO A D D A A A A A D A 
Lebanon NO YES NO A A D D A S D A D D 
Mauritania YES YES NO A A D ND D A A A D S 
Morocco YES YES NO D D D D A A A A D D 
Syria NO YES NO A D D ND A D A A A A 
Tunisia YES YES NO D ND D A A A A A D D 
Turkey NO NO NO D D D D A D A A S D 
EU NO YES NO A D D A A D A A A D 
 
4.3 Economy, Geography and History of Croatia Relative to its 
Partners 
The TLPC of exports from Croatia to all of the other economies is ascending. Figure 4.4 (a) 
shows the amount of exports from Croatia to the EU in thousands of dollar which minimum and 
maximum exports are 2859139.89 and 8595184.73 in year 1999 and 2008 respectively.  
  
 
Figure 4.4 (a) Exports from Croatia to EU; (b) trend line of exports from Croatia to EU 
Partners 
Variables 
a b
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Figure 4.4 (b) represents the linear trend line of exports from Croatia to the EU, which is 
ascending through the years. Figures of all the other partners of Croatia in terms of exports are 
demonstrated in appendix XIII. 
Table 4.6 represents a brief summary of information on exports for all pairs originated from 
Croatia. With a view to average and sum of exports from Croatia to its partners in Table 4.6, it 
can be seen that, the main partners of Croatia are European Union, and Turkey as well as Egypt 
and Albania.   However, the relationship between Croatia and Mauritania in terms of exports is 
the weakest partnership in this group. 
Table 4.6 Exports from Croatia to its partners 
Exports from 
Croatia to 
Max/year Min/Year Average Sum 
Albania 78976.29/2010 2496.62/1995 23105.19 369683.06 
Algeria 19781.86/2009 681.93/2000 8257.23 132115.67 
Egypt 97325.10/2009 10107.27/2002 32461.44 519383.05 
Israel 11427.05/2009 1636.26/1998 6448.37 103174 
Jordan 16836.63/2009 401.60/1996 3558.50 56935.95 
Lebanon 71560.63/2006 323.58/2003 17915.65 286650.34 
Mauritania 2469.76/2010 1017.50/2006 1814.80 9074 
Morocco 19133.42/2004 953.01/1999 5601.17 89618.73 
Syria 37440.89/2009 138.77/1995 8089.54 129432.57 
Tunisia 17920.66/2006 537.75/2004 5097.64 81562.21 
Turkey 140538.08/2009 4623.36/1995 46778.13 748450.10 
EU 8595184.73/2008 2859139.89/1999 4755113.11 76081809.71 
 
Concerning the distance variable, Albania (585 km) is the closest country to Croatia while 
Mauritania is the farthest (4264 km). Among all partners, Croatia has a common border with the 
EU. However, Croatia has no common language or a common colony history with its partners. 
Table 4.7 shows relations among Croatia and all of its partners in terms of the explanatory 
variables. 
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Table 4.7 Status of all pairs originated from Croatia relative to explanatory variables 
 
4.4 Economy, Geography and History of Egypt Relative to its 
Partners 
The TLPC of exports from Egypt to all of its partners is ascending except for Israel. As an 
example, Figure 4.5 (a) shows the amount of exports from Egypt to the EU in thousands of US 
dollar, where the minimum and maximum exports are 1196377.75 and 9211350.53 in years 1998 
and 2008 respectively. Figure 4.5 (b) represents the linear trend line of exports from Egypt to the 
EU which is ascending through the years. Figures of all the other partners of Egypt in terms of 
exports are demonstrated in appendix XIV. 
 
     
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Albania NO NO NO D D D D D D D A A D 
Algeria NO NO NO A D S A A D A A D A 
Egypt NO NO NO A D A A D D D A A A 
Israel NO NO NO A D D D D D A A A D 
Jordan NO NO NO A D D A D A A A A A 
Lebanon NO NO NO A D D D D A A A D A 
Mauritania NO NO NO A A A ND D A A A A D 
Morocco NO NO NO D D D A D D A A A A 
Syria NO NO NO A A D ND D A A A A S 
Tunisia NO NO NO A ND D D D D D A D A 
Turkey NO NO NO A D D D D A A A D A 
EU YES NO NO D D D D A A A A A D 
Variables 
Partners 
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Figure 4.5 (a) Exports from Egypt to EU; (b) trend line of exports from Egypt to EU 
 
Table 4.8 represents a brief summary of information about exports for all partners of Egypt. Sum 
and average of exports in this table show that, the main partners of Egypt are European Union, 
and Turkey as well as Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.   In addition, the relationship between Egypt 
and Croatia in terms of exports is the weakest partnership in this group.  
Table 4.8 Exports from Egypt to its partners 
Exports from 
Egypt to 
Max/year Min/Year Average Sum 
Albania 16699.23/2008 903.27/1997 6707.86 107325.80 
Algeria 380992.88/2009 6944.87/1997 75716.80 121468.72 
Croatia 14341.71/2009 1699.37/1999 6191.87 99069.86 
Israel 351802.56/1996 10630.47/2004 121506.34 1944101.36 
Jordan 930910.62/2009 18940.62/2000 227878.49 3646055.87 
Lebanon 523882.77/2010 23111.26/1999 171350.99 2741615.89 
Mauritania 46564.23/2010 1.50/1995 6509.33 104149.22 
Morocco 402138.01/2010 8076.06/1996 106964.22 1711427.50 
Syria 843430.84/2009 34571.10/1997 220688.47 3531015.56 
Tunisia 254868.42/2009 14510.99/2000 67544.28 1080708.53 
Turkey 985259.79/2010 76527.41/2001 295158.78 4722540.44 
EU 9211350.53/2008 1196377.75/1998 3364806.61 53836905.71 
 
 
 
a b 
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In regards to the distance, Israel and Mauritania are the closest (404 km) and farthest (4939 km) 
countries to Egypt respectively. Egypt has a common language with most of its partners such as 
Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and the EU. Moreover, 
there is a common border between Egypt and Israel. Among all the partners, Egypt has a 
common colony history with Turkey. Table 4.9 shows the relationship between Egypt and all of 
its partners in terms of explanatory variables. 
Table 4.9 Status of all pairs originated from Egypt relative to explanatory variables 
 
4.5 Economy, Geography and History of Israel Relative to its 
Partners 
The TLPC of exports from Israel to most of its partners is ascending excluding Algeria, Lebanon, 
Mauritania, and Tunisia. Figure 4.6 (a) shows the amount of exports from Israel to the EU in 
thousands of US dollar which minimum and maximum exports are 5528323.088 and 17800785 in 
year 1995 and 2008 respectively. Figure 4.6 (b) represents the linear trend line of exports from 
Israel to EU which is ascending through the years. Figures of all the other partners of Israel in 
terms of exports are shown in appendix XV. 
     
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Albania NO NO NO D D D D D D D A A A 
Algeria NO YES NO A A D A A A A A A A 
Croatia NO NO NO A D A A D D D A A A 
Israel YES YES NO S A A A A D D A A D 
Jordan NO YES NO A A D A D D A A A S 
Lebanon NO YES NO S D A D D A A A S D 
Mauritania NO YES NO A A A ND D D D A A D 
Morocco NO YES NO D D A A D D D A A A 
Syria NO YES NO D D S ND A D D A A A 
Tunisia NO YES NO S ND A A A D D A S A 
Turkey NO NO YES A D D D A D D A D A 
EU NO YES NO A A A D D A D A A A 
Variables 
Partners 
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Figure 4.6 (a) Exports from Israel to EU; (b) trend line of exports from Israel to EU 
 
Table 4.10 represents a brief summary of information on exports for all the pairs originated from 
Israel. By considering average and sum of exports from Israel to its partners in Table 4.10, it can 
be seen that, the main partners of Israel are the European Union, and Turkey as well as Jordan 
and Egypt. However, the relationship between Israel and Algeria in terms of exports is the 
weakest partnership in this group. 
Table 4.10 Exports from Israel to its partners 
Exports from 
Israel to 
Max/year Min/Year Average Sum 
Albania 35423/2010 63/1996 5995.5 95928 
Algeria 520/2003 4/2006 197.57 1383 
Croatia 27917/2007 8018/2002 14120.5 225928 
Egypt 153623/2007 26286/2002 77193.5 1235096 
Jordan 288318/2008 543/1995 104027.19 1664435 
Lebanon 773/2003 3/2010 192.2 1922 
Mauritania 4899/2004 55/2001 648.1 6481 
Morocco 20680/2008 5008/1997 10544.69 168715 
Syria 8312/2010 469/2008 5516.33 16549 
Tunisia 3279/1996 100/2010 1194.81 19117 
Turkey 1609994/2008 184024.99/1995 663029.56 10608473 
EU 17800785/2008 5528323.088/1995 10321305 165140879.96 
 
 
b a 
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Concerning the distance variable, Jordan (111 km) is the closest country to Israel while 
Mauritania is the farthest (5291 km). Among all the partners, Israel has a common border with 
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Also, Israel has common language with Algeria, Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. However, there is no common colony history 
between Israel and its partners. Table 4.11 shows the relationship between Israel and all of its 
partners in terms of explanatory variables. 
Table 4.11 Status of all pairs originated from Israel relative to explanatory variables 
 
4.6 Economy, Geography and History of Jordan Relative to its 
Partners 
The TLPC of exports from Jordan to all of its partners is ascending except for Croatia. Figure 4.7 
(a) shows the amount of exports from Jordan to the EU in thousands of dollar, where the 
minimum and maximum exports are 79386.046 and 307894.964 in year 2000 and 2008 
respectively. Figure 4.7 (b) represents the linear trend line of exports from Jordan to the EU 
which is ascending through the years. Figures of exports of all the other partners of Jordan can be 
seen in appendix XVI. 
     
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Albania NO NO NO D D D D A D A A A D 
Algeria NO YES NO D D A D A D A A A D 
Croatia NO NO NO A D D D D D A A A D 
Egypt YES YES NO S A A A A D D A A D 
Jordan YES YES NO A D D A D D A A A D 
Lebanon YES YES NO A A D D D A A A A D 
Mauritania NO NO NO A A A ND D A A A A D 
Morocco NO YES NO D D D A A D A A A D 
Syria YES YES NO D D A ND A D A A A D 
Tunisia NO YES NO D ND D D A D S A A D 
Turkey NO NO NO D D D D A D A A D D 
EU NO NO NO A D D D D D A A D A 
Variables 
Partners 
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Figure 4.7 (a) Exports from Jordan to EU; (b) trend line of exports from Jordan to EU 
 
Table 4.12 represents a brief summary of information about exports for all the pairs originated 
from Jordan. Average and sum of the exports in Table 4.12 show that the main partners of Jordan 
are the European Union, Syria, Israel, and Lebanon. However, the weakest partner of Jordan in 
terms of exports is Mauritania. 
Table 4.12 Exports from Jordan to its partners 
Exports from 
Jordan to 
Max/year Min/Year Average Sum 
Albania 874.49/2001 4.18/1997 294.41 4416.17 
Algeria 133100.2/2008 2778.47/1997 58778.07 881671 
Croatia 2792.17/2002 2.07/2003 305.23 4273.24 
Egypt 153835.61/2008 16993.02/1995 54460.87 816913.04 
Israel 166313.17/2008 22694.93/1997 107781.35 1508938.87 
Lebanon 231259.18/2010 23697.77/1998 83166.58 1247498.67 
Mauritania 347.49/2006 15.51/1997 162.82 1302.54 
Morocco 13380.97/2010 1673.24 5256.86 78852.84 
Syria 307572.82/2007 23621.08/1999 137514.75 2062721.21 
Tunisia 35443.50/2009 4104.78/1997 12592.45 188886.72 
Turkey 60795.84/2010 9785/1998 24813.95 372209.19 
EU 307894.96/2008 79386.05/2000 157431.26 2361468.96 
 
Regarding the distance, Israel (111 km) is the closest country to Jordan and Mauritania is the 
farthest (5400 km). Among all the partners, Jordan has a common border with Israel, Syria, and 
a b 
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the EU. Moreover, there is a common language between Jordan and its partners such as Algeria, 
Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. Jordan has a common colony 
history with none of its partners. Table 4.13 shows the relationship between Jordan and all of its 
partners in terms of the explanatory variables. 
Table 4.13 Status of all pairs originated from Jordan relative to explanatory variables 
 
4.7 Economy, Geography and History of Lebanon Relative to its 
Partners 
The TLPC of exports from Lebanon to most of its partners is ascending, excluding Croatia. 
However, the data on exports for the pair Lebanon-Israel are not available. Figure 4.8 (a) shows 
the amount of exports from Lebanon to the EU in thousands of US dollar, where the minimum 
and maximum exports are 156254.70 and 767923.38 in year 1997 and 2010 respectively. Figure 
4.8 (b) represents the linear trend line of exports from Lebanon to the EU which is ascending 
through the years. Figures of all the other partners of Lebanon in terms of exports can be seen in 
appendix XVII. 
     
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Albania NO NO NO D D D D D A A A A D 
Algeria NO YES NO A D D A A A A A D A 
Croatia NO NO NO A D D A D A A A A A 
Egypt NO YES NO A A D A D D A A A S 
Israel YES YES NO A D D A D D A A A D 
Lebanon NO YES NO A D D D A D A A A D 
Mauritania NO YES NO A A A ND D D A A D D 
Morocco NO YES NO D D A A D D D A A D 
Syria YES YES NO A D D ND A A D A D D 
Tunisia NO YES NO D ND A A D D A A A D 
Turkey NO NO NO A D D D D D A A D A 
EU YES NO NO A D A D D S A A A A 
Variables 
Partners 
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Figure 4.8 (a) Exports from Lebanon to EU; (b) trend line of exports from Lebanon to EU 
 
Table 4.14 represents a summary of information on the exports for all the pairs originated from 
Lebanon. By considering average and sum of exports from Lebanon to its partners in Table 4.14, 
it can be seen that, the main partners of Lebanon are the European Union, Turkey, and Syria.   
However, the relationship of Lebanon and Croatia in terms of exports is the weakest partnership 
in this group. 
Table 4.14 Exports from Lebanon to its partners 
Exports from 
Lebanon to 
Max/year Min/Year Average Sum 
Albania 6430.73/2003 47.08/2006 1535.59 21468.23 
Algeria 29528.73/2008 1587.13/1999 14706.7 205893.77 
Croatia 496.58/1997 0.75/2003 98.24 982.37 
Egypt 201079.99/2010 15246.46/1999 57754.53 808563.43 
Israel No data available  No data available No data available No data available 
Jordan 119109.36/2008 24825/1997 62357.80 873009.25 
Mauritania 2466.88/2007 193.77/2001 1097.98 15371.66 
Morocco 21323.95/2010 2111.47/2002 7908.31 110716.36 
Syria 225443.46/2009 25755.98/2000 124308.40 1740317.58 
Tunisia 15922.81/2010 894.08/1998 5583.23 78165.27 
Turkey 230657.99/2010 14397.04/1999 86259.49 1207632.83 
EU 767923.38/2010 156254.70/1997 295827.85 4141589.92 
 
 
a b 
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Regarding the distance, Syria (85 km) is the closest country to Lebanon while Mauritania is the 
farthest (5376 km). Among all the partners, Lebanon has a common border with Israel and Syria. 
Moreover, there is a common language between Lebanon and its partners such as Algeria, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. There is no common colony history 
between Lebanon and its partners. 
Table 4.15 shows the relationship between Lebanon and all of its partners in terms of explanatory 
variables. 
Table 4.15 Status of all pairs originated from Lebanon relative to explanatory variables 
     
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Albania NO NO NO D D D D D D A A A D 
Algeria NO YES NO A A D D A S D A D D 
Croatia NO NO NO A D D D D A A A D A 
Egypt NO YES NO S D A D D A A A S D 
Israel YES YES NO A A D D D A A A A D 
Jordan NO YES NO A D D D A D A A A D 
Mauritania NO YES NO A D A ND D D A A A D 
Morocco NO YES NO D D D A A D A A D D 
Syria YES YES NO A D D ND A D A A D D 
Tunisia NO YES NO D ND D D A D A A A D 
Turkey NO NO NO A D D D A D A A D D 
EU NO YES NO A D D D D A A A A A 
 
4.8 Economy, Geography and History of Mauritania Relative to its 
Partners 
The TLPC of exports from Mauritania to most of its partners is ascending. However, the data on 
the exports are not available for partners of Mauritania such as Albania, Croatia, Israel, and 
Jordan.  As an example, Figure 4.9 (a) shows the amount of exports from Mauritania to the EU in 
thousands of US dollar which minimum and maximum exports are 73783.44 and 689328.34 in 
Variables 
Partners 
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years 2006 and 2008 respectively. Figure 4.9 (b) represents the linear trend line of exports from 
Mauritania to EU which is ascending through the years. Figures of all the other partners of 
Mauritania in terms of exports are shown in appendix XVIII. 
 
 
Figure 4.9 (a) Exports from Mauritania to EU; (b) trend line of exports from Mauritania to EU 
 
Table 4.16 represents a brief summary of information on the exports for all pairs originated from 
Mauritania. This table shows that the main partners of Mauritania are the European Union, 
Algeria, and Egypt. However, the relationship of Mauritania and Syria is the weakest partnership 
in this group.  
Table 4.16 Exports from Mauritania to its partners 
Exports from 
Mauritania to 
Max/year Min/Year Average Sum 
Albania No available data No available data No available data No available data 
Algeria 15264.52/2004 33.83/2010 5842.32 46738.55 
Croatia No available data No available data No available data No available data 
Egypt 2616.12/2010 22.86/2001 752.63 6773.65 
Israel No available data No available data No available data No available data 
Jordan No available data No available data No available data No available data 
Lebanon 482.97/2005 34.21/2007 227.13 2271.34 
Morocco 482.97/2005 34.21/2007 227.13 2271.34 
Syria 460.78/2008 22.58/2002 213 1064.99 
Tunisia 747.35/2009 21.51/2005 387.7 3876.96 
Turkey 557.76/2010 2.56/2002 157.1 1256.78 
EU 689328.34/2008 73783.44/2006 326045.42 3586499.59 
 
a b 
         68 
 
On the subject of distance, Morocco (1986 km) is the closest country to Mauritania while Syria is 
the farthest (5448 km). Among all the partners, Mauritania has a common border with Algeria. 
Moreover, there is a common language between Mauritania and its partners such as Algeria, 
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. There is no common colony history 
between Mauritania and its partners. Table 4.17 shows the relationship between Mauritania and 
all of its partners in terms of the explanatory variables. 
Table 4.17 Status of all pairs originated from Mauritania relative to explanatory variables 
     
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Albania NO NO NO A D A ND D A A A D A 
Algeria YES YES NO A A D ND D A A A D S 
Croatia NO NO NO A A A ND D A A A A D 
Egypt NO YES NO A A A ND D D D A A D 
Israel NO NO NO A A A ND D A A A A D 
Jordan NO YES NO A A A ND D D A A D D 
Lebanon NO YES NO A D A ND D D A A A D 
Morocco NO YES NO D D A ND D D A A S S 
Syria NO YES NO A D S ND D A A A D D 
Tunisia NO YES NO A ND A ND D A A A A D 
Turkey NO NO NO A D D ND D A A A D D 
EU NO NO NO A A A ND D A D A A D 
 
4.9 Economy, Geography and History of Morocco Relative to its 
Partners 
The TLPC of exports from Morocco to all of the other economies is ascending. However, the 
data on the exports are not available for the pair Morocco-Israel. Figure 4.10 (a) shows the 
amount of exports from Morocco to the EU in thousands of US dollar, where the minimum and 
maximum exports are 2756880.75 and 12032683.51 in year 1997 and 2008 respectively. Figure 
Variables 
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4.10 (b) represents the linear trend line of exports from Morocco to the EU which is ascending 
through the years. Figures of all other partners of Morocco can be seen in appendix XIX. 
 
 
Figure 4.10 (a) Exports from Morocco to EU; (b) trend line of exports from Morocco to EU 
 
Table 4.18 represents a brief summary of information on the exports for all pairs originated from 
Morocco. Based on the sum and average of exports in this table, it is determined that the main 
partners of Morocco are the European Union, Turkey, Tunisia, as well as Algeria and Syria. 
However, the relationship between Morocco and Albania is the weakest partnership in this group. 
Table 4.18 Exports from Morocco to its partners 
Exports from 
Morocco to 
Max/year Min/Year Average Sum 
Albania 1092.10/2008 7.99/2003 493.06 5423.65 
Algeria 138130.66/2010 3359.73/1997 48764.59 780233.48 
Croatia 57380.31/2008 8587.88/2003 18572.88 297166.02 
Egypt 106479.20/2009 3823.89/1996 32340.92 517454.71 
Israel No data available No data available No data available No data available 
Jordan 46950.03/2010 4885.39/1999 17905.61 286489.82 
Lebanon 35230.81/2009 3995.51/2000 15775.46 252407.34 
Mauritania 74919.61/2010 7710.26/1995 26212.95 419407.16 
Syria 61667.89/2010 7166.56/1997 26943.24 431091.84 
Tunisia 143512.53/2010 39111.84/1999 65292.25 1044676.08 
Turkey 342271.20/2010 34737.38/2001 103103.21 1649651.30 
EU 12032683.51/2008 2756880.75/1997 6861051.91 109776830.51 
 
a b 
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Algeria (945 km) is the closest country to Morocco while Jordan is the farthest (3971 km). 
Among all partners, Morocco has a common border with Algeria and the EU. In addition, 
Morocco has a common language with most of its partners such as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Mauritania, Syria, Tunisia, and the EU. However, there is no common colony history 
between Morocco and its partners. Table 4.19 shows the relationship between Morocco and all of 
its partners in terms of the explanatory variables. 
Table 4.19 Status of all pairs originated from Morocco relative to explanatory variables 
     
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Albania NO NO NO D D D D D D A A A D 
Algeria YES YES NO D D D D A A A A D D 
Croatia NO NO NO D D D A D D A A A A 
Egypt NO YES NO D D A A D D D A A A 
Israel NO YES NO D D D A A D A A A D 
Jordan NO YES NO D D A A D D D A A D 
Lebanon NO YES NO D D D A A D A A D D 
Mauritania NO YES NO D D A ND D D A A S S 
Syria NO YES NO D A D ND D D A A A A 
Tunisia NO YES NO D ND S A D D A A D D 
Turkey NO NO NO D D D A D D A A D D 
EU YES YES NO D D D A D D A A A D 
 
4.10 Economy, Geography and History of Syria Relative to its 
Partners 
The TLPC of exports from Syria to most of its partners is ascending except for Croatia. However, 
the data on the exports are not available for the pair Syria-Israel. Figure 4.11 (a) shows the 
amount of exports from Syria to the EU in thousands of US dollar, where the minimum and 
maximum exports are 2913798.97 and 5114321.41 in years 2004 and 2008 respectively. Figure 
4.11 (b) represents the linear trend line of exports from Syria to the EU which is ascending 
Variables 
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through the years. Figures of all the other partners of Syria in terms of export are illustrated in 
appendix XX. 
  
 
Figure 4.11 (a) Exports from Syria to EU; (b) trend line of exports from Syria to EU 
 
Table 4.20 represents a summary of information on the exports for all pairs originated from 
Syria. Based on sum and average of the exports in this table, main partners of Syria are the 
European Union, Lebanon, Jordan as well as Egypt and Algeria. However, the relationship 
between Syria and Albania is the weakest partnership in this group. 
Table 4.20 Exports from Syria to its partners 
Exports from 
Syria to 
Max/year Min/Year Average Sum 
Albania 1280.54/2007 2.87/2003 493.53 2467.64 
Algeria 498555.46/2008 30006.68/2001 166097.22 1328777.78 
Croatia 191413.34/2002 211.48/2008 51346.77 359427.38 
Egypt 730350.33/2008 49941.33/2002 256597.79 2052782.33 
Israel No data available No data available No data available No data available 
Jordan 532472.09/2007 35934.15 169400.20 2371602.74 
Lebanon 1335653.99/2008 136891.41/1999 324652.35 4545132.88 
Mauritania 7434.32/2007 32.12/1995 2773.22 22185.74 
Morocco 218192.51/2007 6742.95/1999 35639.38 498951.36 
Tunisia 92910.55/2007 3249.20/1999 23601.34 330418.80 
Turkey 635431.05/2008 230001.71/1995 401452.21 5620330.97 
EU 5114321.41/2008 2913798.97/2004 4101575.42 32812603.36 
 
a b
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Regarding the distance variable, Lebanon (85 km) is the closest country to Syria while 
Mauritania is the farthest (5448 km). Among all the partners, Syria has a common border with 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and turkey. In addition, Syria has a common language with most of its 
partners such as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. 
Also, there has been a common colony history between Syria and Turkey. Table 4.21 shows the 
relationship between Syria and all of its partners in terms of the explanatory variables. 
Table 4.21 Status of all pairs originated from Syria relative to explanatory variables 
     
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Albania NO NO NO D D ND ND D D A A A A 
Algeria NO YES NO A D D ND A D A A A A 
Croatia NO NO NO A A D ND D A A A A --- 
Egypt NO YES NO D D --- ND A D D A A A 
Israel YES YES NO D D A ND A D A A A D 
Jordan YES YES NO A D D ND A A D A D D 
Lebanon YES YES NO A D D ND A D A A D D 
Mauritania NO YES NO A D --- ND D A A A D D 
Morocco NO YES NO D A D ND D D A A A A 
Tunisia NO YES NO D ND A ND D D A A A D 
Turkey YES NO YES D D D ND D D A A A A 
EU NO NO NO A D A ND D A A A A D 
 
4.11 Economy, Geography and History of Tunisia Relative to its 
Partners 
The TLPC of exports from Tunisia to all of its partners is ascending except for Israel which data 
of exports for this economy are not available. Figure 4.12 (a) shows the amount of exports from 
Tunisia to the EU in thousands of US dollar, where the minimum and maximum exports are 
3999856.20 and 13920178.65 in the years 1995 and 2008 respectively. Figure 4.12 (b) represents 
Variables 
Partners 
         73 
 
the linear trend line of exports from Tunisia to the EU, which is ascending through the years. 
Figures of exports of all the other partners of Tunisia can be seen in appendix XXI. 
  
 
Figure 4.12 (a) Exports from Tunisia to EU; (b) trend line of exports from Tunisia to EU 
 
Table 4.22 represents a summary of information on exports for all the pairs originated from 
Tunisia. In this table, the sum and average of the exports show that the main partners of Tunisia 
are the European Union, Algeria, Turkey, and Morocco. However, the relationship between 
Tunisia and Croatia is the weakest partnership in this group. 
Table 4.22 Exports from Tunisia to its partners 
Exports from 
Tunisia to 
Max/year Min/Year Average Sum 
Albania 5834.12/2006 43.89/1996 2126.21 31893.22 
Algeria 474719.93/2010 27010.67/1998 176185.98 2818975.61 
Croatia 8478283/2010 172.92/1999 1990.08 23880.98 
Egypt 128861.65/2008 23757.47/1999 47853.82 765661.07 
Israel No data available No data available No data available No data available 
Jordan 17339.97/2009 1335.26/1996 7505.14 120082.26 
Lebanon 15250.35/2010 3549.79/2003 7666.09 122657.45 
Mauritania 24497.53/2010 526.98/1996 7277.17 116434.68 
Morocco 234151.43/2010 25412.56/2000 92854.89 1485678.23 
Syria 32349.24/2010 2454.59/1999 9752.81 156044.99 
Turkey 309382.71/2008 33657.65/1995 106212.22 1699395.52 
EU 13920178.65/2008 3999856.20/1995 7322185.22 117154963.58 
a b 
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Albania (642 km) is the closest country to Tunisia while Mauritania is the farthest (3297 km). 
Among all the partners, Tunisia has a common border with Algeria. In addition, Tunisia has a 
common language with most of its partners such as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, and the EU. Also, there has been a common colony history between 
Tunisia and Turkey. Table 4.23 shows the relationship between Tunisia and all of its partners in 
terms of explanatory variables. 
Table 4.23 Status of all pairs originated from Tunisia relative to explanatory variables 
     
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Albania NO NO NO D ND D D A D D A A D 
Algeria YES YES NO D ND D A A A A A D D 
Croatia NO NO NO A ND D D D D D A D A 
Egypt NO YES NO S ND A A A D D A S A 
Israel NO YES NO D ND D D A D S A A D 
Jordan NO YES NO D ND A A D D A A A D 
Lebanon NO YES NO D ND D D A D A A A D 
Mauritania NO YES NO A ND A ND D A A A A D 
Morocco NO YES NO D ND S A D D A A D D 
Syria NO YES NO D ND A ND D D A A A D 
Turkey NO NO YES S ND D D D D A A D A 
EU NO YES NO A ND A D D D A A A A 
 
4.12 Economy, Geography and History of Turkey Relative to its 
Partners 
The TLPC of exports from Turkey to all of its partners is ascending. Figure 4.13 (a) shows the 
amount of exports from Turkey to the EU in thousands of US dollar, where the minimum and 
maximum exports are 11950063.24 and 64450862.09 in year 1995 and 2008 respectively. Figure 
4.13 (b) represents the linear trend line of exports from Turkey to the EU, which is ascending 
Variables 
Partners 
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through the years. Figures of all the other partners of Turkey in terms of exports are demonstrated 
in appendix XXII. 
  
 
Figure 4.13 (a) Exports from Turkey to EU; (b) trend line of exports from Turkey to EU 
 
Table 4.24 represents a summary of information on the exports for all pairs originated from 
Turkey. Based on the sum and average of the exports in this table, main partners of Turkey are 
the European Union, Israel, Egypt, and Algeria. However, the relationship between Turkey and 
Mauritania is the weakest partnership in this group. 
Table 4.24 Exports from Turkey to its partners 
Exports from 
Turkey to 
Max/year Min/Year Average Sum 
Albania 305782.84/2008 41042.28/1997 141897.59 2270361.43 
Algeria 1782012.62/2009 268934.66/1995 775137.50 12402199.98 
Croatia 355520.25/2007 23379.53/2000 123403.52 1982456.30 
Egypt 2618572.11/2009 245172.74/1995 771609.05 12345744.76 
Israel 2082969.56/2010 239529.30/1995 1051697.70 16827163.27 
Jordan 572215.15/2010 88111.78/1999 240864.29 3853828.61 
Lebanon 686514.08/2009 127400.42/2000 283695.23 4539123.65 
Mauritania 37436.15/2010 247.04/1995 8592.41 137478.60 
Morocco 957781.72/2008 51883.81/1997 312614.99 5001834.81 
Syria 1848783.92/2010 18274.48/2000 579272.52 9268360.26 
Tunisia 778113.91/2008 79259.87/1995 316825.51 5069208.19 
EU 64450862.09/2008 11950063.24/1995 31514435.51 504230968.20 
 
a b 
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Regarding the distance variable, Albania (765 km) is the closest country to Turkey while 
Mauritania is the farthest (4963 km). Among all the partners, Turkey has a common border with 
Syria and the EU. However, there is no common language between turkey and its partners. In 
addition, there is a common colony history between Turkey and its partners such as Albania, 
Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia. Table 4.25 shows the relationship between Turkey and all of its 
partners in terms of the explanatory variable. 
Table 4.25 Status of all pairs originated from Turkey relative to explanatory variables 
     
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Albania NO NO YES D D D ND D D A A A D 
Algeria NO NO NO D D D D A D A A S D 
Croatia NO NO NO A D D D D A A A D A 
Egypt NO NO YES A D D D A D D A D A 
Israel NO NO NO D D D D A D A A D D 
Jordan NO NO NO A D D D D D A A D A 
Lebanon NO NO NO A D D D A D A A D D 
Mauritania NO NO NO A D D ND D A A A D D 
Morocco NO NO NO D D D A D D A A D D 
Syria YES NO YES D D D ND D D A A A A 
Tunisia NO NO YES S ND D D D D A A D A 
EU YES NO NO D D D D A A A A A D 
 
Table 4.26 shows the trend line of plot chart (TLPC) of the dependent variable, exports. The first 
column shows the exporting countries and the first row shows the importing countries.  
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Table 4.26 TLPC of the dependent variable, exports, of each country as an exporter relative to its 
partners 
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Albania   D D A A A ND ND ND A ND A A 
Algeria A   D A ND A A D A A A A A 
Croatia A A   A A A A A A A A A A 
Egypt A A A   D A A A A A A A A 
Israel D A A A   A D D A A D A A 
Jordan A A D A A   A A A A A A A 
Lebanon A A D A ND A   A A A A A A 
Mauritania ND A ND A ND ND A   A A A A A 
Morocco A A A A ND A A A   A A A A 
Syria A A D A ND A A A A   A A A 
Tunisia A A A A ND A A A A A   A A 
Turkey A A A A A A A A A A A   A 
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CHAPITRE 5 RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODS 
5.1 Methodology 
The empirical analysis is based on a variant of the gravity model, commonly used to analysing 
international trade. The dataset is composed of aggregate annual bilateral flows of volume of 
exports of Mediterranean Union countries. The data cover the period from 1995 to 2010. As 
mentioned before, the Mediterranean Union is composed of countries from the Middle East and 
Northern Africa (MENA region) and the European Union (EU). However, some countries from 
the Mediterranean Union are not included in this empirical analysis due to the lack of data. The 
countries investigated in this study are 12 members from the MENA region (Albania, Algeria, 
Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) and the 
EU as a whole. We will investigate three regions to see if they can be appropriate candidates for 
integration or adopting a common currency: 
1. The Mediterranean Union (composed of 12 countries from the MENA region and EU), 
2. The MENA region (12 countries in our data set) and 
3. Eight selected countries from the MENA region (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey ) 
Each region will be examined by six gravity models based on Rose (2000), Sapir (2001), Egger 
(2002), Peridy (2005), Warin, Wunnava et al. (2008), and Warin, Wunnava et al. (2009). We will 
use two kinds of estimations, which are used frequently for panel data: random effects estimation 
and fixed effects estimation. In addition, all estimations use volume of exports as the dependent 
variable, which is defined as following:  
tjitji XLnExportLn ,, )(   
Where X ij,t are exports from country i to country j at time t. 
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For the first region (Mediterranean Union), there are N = (12* 11) + (12*1) = 144 bilateral 
relationships per time period14. The data cover the period from 1995 to 2010, yielding a total 
sample of n = 144 *16 =2304 bilateral observations. Since the dataset includes a few missing 
observations, the actual dataset is slightly smaller and unbalanced.   
For the second region (MENA region), there are N = (12* 11) = 132 bilateral relationships per 
time period. The data cover the period from 1995 to 2010, yielding a total sample of n = 132 *16 
= 2112 bilateral observations. Since the dataset includes a few missing observations, the actual 
dataset is slightly smaller and unbalanced.   
For the third region (8 countries from the MENA region), there are N = (8* 7) = 56 bilateral 
relationships per time period. The data cover the period from 1995 to 2010, yielding a total 
sample of n = 56 *16 = 896 bilateral observations per time period. Since the dataset includes a 
few missing observations, the actual dataset is slightly smaller and unbalanced.   
5.1.1 Six Different Gravity Models 
Following equations show the six gravity models used in this research study: 
Gravity Model as in (Rose 2000) 
tjitjitjitji
tjitjitjitji
GDPCAPLnCOMCOLCOMLANG
COMBORDISLnECOSIZELnExportLn
,,6,5,4
,3,2,10, )(




 
Gravity Model as in (Sapir 2001) 
tjitji
tjitjitji
COMLANG
DISLnECOSIZELnExportLn
,,3
,2,10, )(




 
 
 
                                                 
14 The first parentheses refer to exports between countries from the MENA region and the second parentheses refer 
to exports from 12 countries in the MENA to the EU. 
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Gravity Model as in (Egger 2002) 
tjitjitjitji
tjitjitjitji
SGDPCAPLnCOMLANG
COMBORDISLnECOSIZELnExportLn
,,6,5,4
,3,2,10, )(




 
Gravity Model as in (Peridy 2005) 
tjitji
tjitjitjitji
COMLANG
COMBORDISLnECOSIZELnExportLn
,,4
,3,2,10, )(




 
Gravity Model as in (Warin, Wunnava et al. 2008) 
tjitjitjitjitji
tjitjitjitji
RSGDEBTLn
BUDGLnINTLnDISLnExportLn
,,7,6,5,4
,3,2,10, )(




 
Gravity Model as in (Warin, Wunnava et al. 2009) 
tjitjitjitjitji
tjitjitjitji
tjitjitjitji
GDPCAPLnRESLnEXPLnDEBTLn
INFLnBUDGLnCOMCOLCOMLANG
COMBORDISLnECOSIZELnExportLn
,,11,10,9,8
,7,6,5,4
,3,2,10, )(






 
 
Table 5.1 shows different models based on their own independent variables. Expected sign is 
written beside each variable.
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Table 5.1 Different gravity models by different variables 
 Rose 
(2000)
Sapir 
(2001)
Egger 
(2002)
Peridy 
(2005)
Warin, 
Wunnava et 
al (2008) 
Warin 
Wunnava et 
al (2009) 
Economic size (+)       
Distance (-)       
Common border (+)       
Common language (+)       
Common colony (+)/(-)       
Interest rate (-)       
Budget deficit (-)       
Inflation (-)       
Debt (-)       
Expenditure (-)       
Reserve position (-)       
Market size (+)       
Income similarity (+)       
Factor endowment (-)       
GDP per capita (-)       
 
5.1.2 Definition of Variables 
Ln dis indicates the log of the distance between the capitals of two countries. Distance serves as 
a proxy for trade and transportation costs, which has a negative impact on volume of exports 
between two countries. Communication and coordination costs are also associated with the costs 
of distance.  
Dummy Variables 
COMBOR is a dummy variable that controls for a common border between two trading partners. 
This variable takes a value of one if two trading partners in a pair share a common border (land 
border or see border) and a value of zero otherwise. 
COMLANG refers to a dummy variable that takes a value of one if two trading partners in a pair 
share a common language and a value of zero otherwise. 
COMCOL is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if two trading partners in a pair have 
had the same colonizer at any time period and a value of zero otherwise. 
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Convergence Variables  
Ln INT indicates the log of the absolute value of the difference in “interest rates” between two 
countries. A negative coefficient is expected for this variable due to the fact that interest rate 
measures the long-term cost of borrowing. Convergence of interest rate of two trading partners 
would increase the confidence of two partners. 
Ln BUDG indicates the log of the absolute value of the difference in “budget surplus or deficit” 
as a percentage of GDP between two countries. This variable captures the effect of government 
fiscal responsibility. Hence, a convergence in the balance of the budget surplus is expected to 
increase volume of exports and trade between countries.  
Ln INF indicates the log of the absolute value of the difference in “inflation” as the annual 
percentage between two countries. (Fleming 1971) notes that when inflation rate between 
countries is low and similar over time, the terms of trade will also remain fairly stable. Therefore, 
a negative coefficient is expected for this variable.  
Ln DEBT indicates the log of the absolute value of difference of “government debt” as a 
percentage of GDP between two countries. A reduction in the debt differential between countries 
is likely to lead to an increase in trade flows. Therefore, a negative coefficient is expected for this 
variable.  
Ln EXP indicates the log of the absolute value of difference of “government expenditure” as a 
percentage of GDP between the two countries. Existence of convergence in public expenditure 
could be used as an indicator of the rational distribution of welfare between two countries. The 
coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative. 
Ln RES indicates the log of the absolute value of difference of “reserve position” as a percentage 
of GDP between the two countries. The coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative. 
Ln GDPCAP indicates the log of the absolute value of difference of “GDP per capita” between 
two countries. This variable measures differences in the standard of living. The coefficient of this 
variable is also expected to be negative.  
Hecksher Ohlin Variables 
G measures the market size or overall economic space of two countries. This variable is expected 
to have a positive impact on volume of exports.  
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S is the measure of relative size of two economies. The index of income similarity takes the 
values between -∞ (i.e. the log of a number near zero) in case of perfect dissimilarity and -0.69 
(the log of 0.5) for perfect similarity. Similarity in size should have a positive effect on volume of 
exports and volume of trade as (Krugman and Helpman 1985) predict that countries similar in 
size will trade more.  
R is the measure of relative difference between two countries in terms of relative “factor 
endowment”. R in this study is measured by the ratio of gross fixed capital formation and country 
population. In the case of equality in relative factor endowment, the factor endowment takes a 
minimum value of zero. This variable takes a maximum value that approaches one representing 
the largest possible difference in relative factor endowment.  The coefficient of this variable is 
expected to be negative.  
Variables are defined as following equations:  
 tjtitji GDPGDPECOSIZELn ,,, ln   
 tjitij ceDisLnDISLn ,,, tan  
tjtitij eresterestLnINTLn ,,, intint   
tjtitij budgetbudgetLnBUDGLn ,,,   
tjtitij lationlationLnINFLn ,,, infinf   
tjtitij debtdebtLnDEBTLn ,,,   
tjtitij enditureenditureLnEXPLn ,,, expexp   
tjtitij positionreservepositionreserveLnRESLn ,,,   
tjtitij capitaperGDPcapitaperGDPLnGDPCAPLn ,,,   
 tjtitji GDPGDPLnG ,,,   
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5.2 Sources of Data 
The data on GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth, interest rate, inflation and foreign reserve 
position are taken from World Bank’s World Development Indicators. In addition, data on 
government debt, government expenditure and budget deficit are taken from International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The GDP values and GDP per capita values are expressed in current US 
dollar. Government debt, government expenditure, budget deficit and foreign reserve position are 
expressed as a percentage of GDP and GDP growth is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP. 
The interest rate values are expressed as the annual percentage. Inflation is measured by the 
consumer price index. Data on bilateral distances, colonial history, country adjacency and 
common official language are taken from a database maintained by the Centre d’Etudes 
Prospectives et d’Information Internationales (CEPII). The bilateral distances, measured in 
kilometres are distances between the countries’ capitals. Data on exports between countries are 
collected from The United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) and 
expressed in current US dollar. Table 5.2 shows a brief description about dependent and all 
independent variables 
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Table 5.2 Data sources and descriptions 
Variables  Unit Definition Data Sources 
Dependent variable 
Ln EXPORTijt 
 
Log (%GDP) 
 
    Exports from country i to country j 
 
UN Comtrade 
Dummy variables 
COMBOR 
COMLANG 
COMCOL 
 
0 or 1 
0 or 1 
0 or 1 
 
    Common border 
    Common language 
    Common colony 
 
CEPII 
CEPII 
CEPII 
Convergence variables 
Ln INT 
Ln BUDG 
Ln INF 
Ln DEBT 
Ln EXP 
Ln RES 
Ln GDPCAP 
 
Log (annual %) 
Log (% GDP) 
Log (annual %) 
Log (% GDP) 
Log (% GDP) 
Log (% GDP) 
Log (US $) 
 
   Absolute value of difference of interest rate 
   Absolute value of difference of budget deficit 
   Absolute value of difference of inflation 
   Absolute value of difference of government debt 
   Absolute value of difference of government expenditure 
   Absolute value of difference of reserves position 
   Absolute value of difference of GDP per capita 
 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
International Monetary Fund 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
International Monetary Fund 
International Monetary Fund 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
Hecksher Ohlin variables 
G 
S 
R 
  
   Market size 
   Income similarity 
  Absolute value of relative difference of factor   
endowments 
Three Hecksher Ohlin variables are formulated 
based on GDP and gcf (gross capital 
formation). Data on GDP and gcf are taken 
from World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. 
 
Ln DIS                                       
Ln ECOSIZE      
Log(distance) 
Log (GDP) 
    distance between the capitals of two countries 
    Economic size of two countries  
 CEPII 
 World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
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5.3 Analysing Integration of the Mediterranean Union Based on Six 
Gravity Models 
In this section, the Mediterranean Union is examined to investigate whether this area is an 
appropriate candidate for integration or not. the Examination is done based on six mentioned 
gravity models. tthe Conclusion on this debate comes out from the combination of the results of 
these six gravity models. 
5.3.1 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of the Mediterranean Union based 
on Rose (2000)'s Specifications 
The first column in Table 5.3 shows the results following the random effects estimation. This 
estimation confirms that economic size has a highly significant impact on the volume of exports 
between countries in the Mediterranean Union. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that a 
one percent increase in economic size raises volume of exports by about .36 percent. Based on 
random effects estimation, variables such as distance, common border and absolute value of 
difference of GDP per capita are known insignificant determinant of volume of exports between 
two countries in a given pair in the Mediterranean Union. Speaking the same language and 
having a common colony significantly increases exports between the two countries at significant 
level of 1% and 10% respectively.  
In order to make sure that coefficient estimated by the random effects estimator are the same as 
the coefficients estimated by the fixed effects, the Hausman test takes into account. However, the 
magnitude of p-value, 7.57556e, is lower than 0.05. Hence, the fixed effects estimation is better 
than the random effects estimation due to inconsistence coefficients by random effects estimator. 
Fixed effects estimation confirms that the higher the economic size of each pair of countries, the 
higher the volume of exports between those countries. In addition, Lower distance increases 
volume of exports between countries. However, results derived from this estimator show that 
exports volume between countries in the Mediterranean Union is not significantly related to 
common border, common language, common colony and convergence in GDP per capita. 
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Table 5.3 Results of gravity model by Rose (2000), Mediterranean Union 
 
5.3.2 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of the Mediterranean Union based 
on Sapir (2001)'s Specifications  
Table 5.4 shows the results of the gravity model for our dataset on the Mediterranean Union 
based on Sapir (2001)'s specifications. By random effects estimation, all variables have the 
expected sign and are statistically significant.  
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Rose (2000), Mediterranean Union 
Estimation 
Methods 
RE Std. Error p-value FE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -18.906*** 2.739 <0.00001 -18.02*** 2.70472 <0.00001 
ln ECOSIZE 0.356 *** 0.036 <0.00001 0.374 *** 0.036 <0.00001 
ln DIS -0.450 0.291 0.121 -0.591 ** 0.277 0.033 
COMBOR 0.917 0.760 0.228 1.069 0.689 0.121 
COMLANG 1.293 *** 0.468 0.006 0.674 0.498 0.176 
COMCOL 1.887 * 0.971 0.052 1.366 0.891 0.125 
ln  GDPCAP 0.026 0.052 0.615 0.028 0.053 0.595 
Albania    -2.726*** 0.928 0.0002 
Algeria    -1.097 1.004 0.631 
Croatia    -1.670 0.938 0.877 
Egypt    -1.471 0.968 0.663 
Israel    -2.596*** 0.969 0.002 
Jordan    -1.324 0.973 0.476 
Lebanon    -1.926 1.001 0.981 
Mauritania    -0.835 1.041 0.833 
Morocco    -0.932 1.009 0.715 
Syria    -0.987 0.972 0.233 
Tunisia    -1.576 0.972 0.831 
P-value of  Hausman test                                       7.57556e-007 
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Table 5.4 Results of gravity model by Sapir (2001), Mediterranean Union 
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Sapir (2001), Mediterranean Union 
Estimation 
Methods 
RE Std. Error p-value FE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -17.088*** 2.399 <0.00001 -15.698*** 2.347 <0.00001 
ln ECOSIZE 0.369*** 0.030 <0.00001 0.388 *** 0.030 <0.00001 
ln DIS -0.711 *** 0.241 0.00326 -0.894 *** 0.224 0.00007 
COMLANG 1.180 *** 0.439 0.00740 0.670 0.477 0.160 
Albania    -3.768 *** 0.906 0.00003 
Algeria    -0.683 0.978 0.485 
Croatia    -0.246 0.893 0.782 
Egypt    -0.784 0.959 0.413 
Israel    -3.270 *** 0.933 0.0005 
Jordan    0.254 0.947 0.789 
Lebanon    -0.493 0.975 0.613 
Mauritania    0.130 1.013 0.898 
Morocco    0.162 0.987 0.869 
Syria    0.988 0.963 0.305 
Tunisia    -0.504 0.965 0.601 
P-value of  Hausman test                                       2.82671e-007 
 
However, the Hausman test confirms that coefficients estimated by the random effects estimation 
are not the same as ones estimated by the fixed effects estimation. Therefore, fixed effects 
estimation takes into account and confirms that economic size has a highly significant impact on 
the volume of exports between countries in the Mediterranean Union. The magnitude of the 
coefficient suggests that a one percent increase in economic size raises volume of exports by 
about .39 percent. The distance term is strongly negative, implying that a one percent increase in 
distance between two countries decreases the volume of exports by about .89 percent. However, 
common language is a statistically insignificant determinant of volume of exports between 
countries in the Mediterranean Union. 
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5.3.3 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of the Mediterranean Union based 
on Egger (2002)'s Specifications  
Table 5.5 shows the results of the gravity model for our dataset on the Mediterranean Union 
based on Egger (2002)'s specifications. Based on the random effects estimation, variables such as 
economic size, distance and common language have the expected sign and are statistically 
significant. Moreover, common border and convergence in GDP per capita are known 
statistically insignificant. The volume of exports between the countries in the Mediterranean 
Union is negatively related to income similarity based on the random effects estimation. 
However, the magnitude of p-value based on the Hausman test confirms that coefficients 
estimated by the random effects estimation are not the same as ones estimated by the fixed effects 
estimation. Therefore, going through fixed effects estimation following results is achieved. The 
Coefficient of the variable ‘economic size’ confirms that exports volumes between the countries 
are positively and significantly related to this variable. A one percent increase in the economic 
size raises the volume of exports by about .39 percent.  
If distance between two countries decrease by one percent, volume of exports increases by about 
.91 percent. Common border and convergence in GDP per capita are found to be insignificant 
determinant of the volume of exports based on Egger (2002)'s specifications. Common language 
is lowly significant determinant of the volume of exports between the countries in the 
Mediterranean Union with a positive impact. Volume of Exports between two countries which 
share a common language is .90 percent higher than for two countries that do not share a 
common language based on the fixed effects estimation and Egger (2002)'s specification. Like 
random effects estimation, fixed effects estimation also shows that volume of exports between 
countries is negatively related to the income similarity. If incomes of two countries become 
similar by one percent, the volume of exports decreases by about .58 percent. 
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Table 5.5 Results of gravity model by Egger (2002), Mediterranean Union 
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Egger (2002), Mediterranean Union 
Estimation 
Methods 
RE Std. Error p-value FE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -18.031*** 2.653 <0.00001 -16.813 *** 2.613 <0.00001 
ln ECOSIZE 0.379 *** 0.036 <0.00001 0.387 *** 0.036 <0.00001 
ln DIS -0.776 *** 0.286 0.007 -0.907 *** 0.272 0.00086 
COMBOR 0.411 0.738 0.578 0.452 0.672 0.501 
COMLANG 1.336 *** 0.435 0.002 0.901 * 0.472 0.056 
S -0.500 *** 0.053 0.814 -0.582 *** 0.113 <0.00001 
ln  GDPCAP -0.012 0.120 0.00003 -0.009 0.053 0.866 
Albania    -3.725 *** 0.866 0.00002 
Algeria    -0.592 0.939 0.529 
Croatia    0.191 0.860 0.824 
Egypt    -0.620 0.918 0.499 
Israel    -3.199 *** 0.898 0.0003 
Jordan    0.318 0.906 0.726 
Lebanon    -0.295 0.937 0.753 
Mauritania    -0.619 0.984 0.530 
Morocco    0.348 0.947 0.714 
Syria    1.157 0.921 0.209 
Tunisia    -0.261 0.923 0.778 
P-value of  Hausman test                               1.40192e-006 
 
5.3.4 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of the Mediterranean Union based 
on Peridy (2005)'s Specifications  
Peridy (2005) introduced a gravity model based on explanatory variables such as economic size, 
distance, common border and common language. Based on Peridy's specifications and Table 5.6, 
all variables included in this specification are correctly signed.  
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Table 5.6 Results of gravity model by Peridy (2005), Mediterranean Union 
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Peridy (2005), Mediterranean Union 
Estimation 
Methods 
RE Std. Error p-value FE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -18.770 *** 2.695 <0.00001 -11.014 *** 2.631 <0.00001 
ln ECOSIZE 0.367 *** 0.030 <0.00001 0.793*** 0.030 <0.00001 
ln DIS -0.483 * 0.293 0.099 -1.075 *** 0.278 0.029 
COMBOR 1.052 0.765 0.169 -0.342 0.688 0.081 
COMLANG 1.029 ** 0.454 0.024 1.280 *** 0.488 0.312 
Albania    -17.762 *** 0.907 0.00003 
Algeria    0.385 0.983 0.391 
Croatia    -0.606 0.894 0.757 
Egypt    1.202 0.963 0.507 
Israel    0.493 *** 0.936 0.0003 
Jordan    -3.768 0.950 0.713 
Lebanon    -0.843 0.980 0.739 
Mauritania    -0.276 1.020 0.948 
Morocco    -0.639 0.991 0.979 
Syria    -3.373 0.964 0.343 
Tunisia    0.350 0.967 0.672 
P-value of  Hausman test                               5.69169e-007 
 
Economic size and distance are respectively highly and lowly significant determinants of the 
trade flow based on the random effects estimation. Speaking the same language is significant at 
5% level and common border is insignificant determinant of the volume of exports between 
countries in the Mediterranean Union based on the random effects estimation.  
However, the Hausman test confirms inconsistency of these coefficients with the ones estimated 
by the fixed effects estimation. Hence, the fixed effects estimator gives us a better estimation 
with more efficient coefficients. Based on the fixed effects estimation, economic size, distance 
and speaking the same language are statistically significant with the expected sign. If economic 
size of two countries (in a given pair) increases by one percent, volume of exports increases by 
  92 
 
about .79 percent. In addition, the coefficient of distance is also strongly negative, implying that 
one percent increase in distance between two countries decreases volume of exports by about 
1.08 percent. Moreover, the fixed effects estimation shows that volume of Exports between two 
countries which share a common language is 1.28 percent higher than for two countries that do 
not share a common language based on Peridy (2005)'s specification. 
5.3.5 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of the Mediterranean Union based 
on Warin; Wunnava et al (2008)'s Specifications  
 
Table 5.7 Results of gravity model by Warin, Wunnava et al (2008), Mediterranean Union 
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Warin; Wunnava et al (2008), Mediterranean Union 
Estimation Methods RE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -20.928 *** 4.675 0.00001 
ln DIS -0.829 ** 0.390 0.034 
ln INT -0.106 0.121 0.384 
ln BUDG 0.009 0.089 0.917 
ln DEBT 0.027 0.075 0.718 
G 0.896 *** 0.158 <0.00001 
S -0.337 0.246 0.171 
R -0.198 0.198 0.318 
P-value of  Hausman test                               0.058 
 
Among gravity variables introduced by Warin, Wunnava et al (2008) in Table 5.7 only distance 
and market size are statistically significant determinants of the volume of exports between the 
countries in the Mediterranean Union based on the random effects estimation.  
The null hypothesis of the random effects estimation is not rejected again by the Hausman test 
and it is safe to use the random effects estimation. The coefficient of distance in the random 
effects estimation is strongly negative implying that a one percent increase in distance between 
two countries decreases the volume of exports by about .83 percent. Moreover, if the variable 
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market size of two countries increases by one percent, the volume of exports increases by about 
.90%.  
Explanatory variables such as convergence in interest rate, convergence in budget deficit, 
convergence in government debt, relative difference of countries in terms of factor endowment 
and also income similarity are found to be statistically insignificant determinants of the volume 
of exports based on the fixed effects estimation.  
5.3.6 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of the Mediterranean Union based 
on Warin, Wunnava et al (2009)'s Specifications  
Based on Warin, Wunnava et al (2009)'s specifications and Table 5.8, economic size and 
common language are known statistically significant among all variables included in this 
specification based on the random effects estimation. However, the Hausman test confirms the 
rejection of null hypothesis of the random effects estimation. Therefore, the following results are 
achieved based on the fixed effects estimation. Among all variables, economic size is a highly 
significant determinant of the volume of exports between two countries in a given pair in the 
Mediterranean Union. A one percent increase in economic size of two countries increases the 
volume of exports by about .66 percent. In addition, common language and convergence in 
reserve position are both lowly significant determinants of the volume of exports with the 
expected sign. Volume of Exports between two countries which share a common language is 1.11 
percent higher than for two countries that do not share a common language based on Warin, 
Wunnava et al (2009)'s specification. Also, if absolute values of difference of reserve position of 
two countries decrease by one percent the volume of trade increases by about .13 percent based 
on the fixed effects estimator. Following variables are found to be insignificant based on Warin, 
Wunnava et al (2008)'s specification by the fixed effects estimator: distance, common border, and 
common colony, convergence in budget, inflation, debt, expenditure and GDP per capita.  
 
  
  94 
 
 
Table 5.8 Results of gravity model by Warin, Wunnava et al (2009), Mediterranean Union 
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Warin; Wunnava et al (2009), Mediterranean Union 
Estimation 
Methods 
RE Std. Error p-value FE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -28.975 *** 4.330 <0.00001 -31.204*** 4.454 <0.00001 
ln ECOSIZE 0.625 *** 0.082 <0.00001 0.656 *** 0.083 <0.00001 
ln DIS -0.645 0.401 0.108 -0.589 *** 0.400 0.142 
COMBOR -0.074 0.926 0.936 0.773 0.931 0.407 
COMLANG 1.402 ** 0.554 0.011 1.110 * 0.618 0.073 
COMCOL 1.025 1.253 0.414 0.339 1.210 0.779 
ln BUDG -0.021 0.104 0.843 -0.041 0.104 0.696 
ln INF -0.020 0.090 0.823 -0.030 0.090 0.739 
ln DEBT -0.014 0.092 0.880 -0.007 0.093 0.940 
ln EXP 0.031 0.089 0.728 0.069 0.089 0.440 
ln RES -0.103 0.071 0.148 -0.131* 0.071 0.068 
ln  GDPCAP -0.135 0.124 0.276 -0.043 0.125 0.731 
Albania    -3.710** 1.548 0.017 
Algeria    -0.418 1.170 0.721 
Croatia    0.051 1.112 0.963 
Egypt    -0.438 1.076 0.684 
Israel    -3.065 *** 1.104 0.005 
Jordan    0.818 1.097 0.456 
Lebanon    0.187 1.136 0.869 
Morocco    -0.221 1.170 0.850 
Tunisia    1.152 1.160 0.321 
P-value of  Hausman test                               0.000128604 
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5.3.7 Country Fixed Effects in the Mediterranean Union 
To separate country fixed effects, symmetric country dummy variables are generated. These 
dummies are proxies for countries’ participation as either source of exports or origin of imports. 
There are small exports volumes interactions between the countries investigated in this study 
from the Mediterranean Union. Smaller economies such as Albania and Israel show minimum 
trade interactions with the other countries. 
5.4 Analysing Integration of the MENA Region Based on Six 
Gravity Models 
In this section, the MENA region is examined to investigate whether this area is an appropriate 
candidate for integration or not. Examination is done based on six mentioned gravity models. 
Conclusion on this debate comes out from the combination of results of these six gravity models. 
5.4.1 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of the MENA Region based on Rose 
(2000)'s Specifications 
Table 5.9 shows the results of the gravity model for our dataset on the MENA region based on 
Rose (2000)'s specifications. By the random effects estimation, variables such as economic size, 
distance, common language and common colony have the expected sign and are statistically 
significant. However, common border and convergence in GDP per capita are known statistically 
insignificant determinant of exports flow between the countries in the MENA region.  
However, the Hausman test confirms that coefficients estimated by the random effects estimation 
are not the same as ones estimated by the fixed effects estimation (with p-value of 0.0146595 < 
0.05). Therefore, the fixed effects estimation takes into account and confirms that economic size 
has a highly significant impact on the volume of exports between countries in the MENA region. 
The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that a one percent increase in economic size raises the 
volume of exports by about .34%. The distance term is strongly negative, implying that a one 
percent increase in distance between two countries decreases the volume of exports by about 
1.04%.  
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Table 5.9 Results of gravity model by Rose (2000), MENA region 
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Rose (2000), MENA region 
Estimation 
Methods 
RE Std. Error p-value FE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -15.623*** 2.858 <0.00001 -13.521 *** 2.878 <0.00001 
ln ECOSIZE 0.338 *** 0.039 <0.00001 0.340 *** 0.039 <0.00001 
ln DIS -0.843 *** 0.289 0.003 -1.030 *** 0.279 0.0002 
COMBOR -0.271 0.817 0.740 -0.255 0.751 0.734 
COMLANG 1.856 *** 0.480 0.0001 1.322 *** 0.501 0.008 
COMCOL 2.6426 *** 0.936 0.004 2.185 ** 0.863 0.011 
ln  GDPCAP 0.020 0.055 0.719 0.0308 0.055 0.580 
Albania    -3.812 *** 0.927 0.00004 
Algeria    -0.449 1.004 0.654 
Croatia    0.353 0.935 0.705 
Egypt    -0.690 0.959 0.471 
Israel    -3.316 *** 0.977 0.0007 
Jordan    0.469 0.979 0.631 
Lebanon    -0.264 0.997 0.791 
Mauritania    0.045 1.051 0.966 
Morocco    0.458 0.999 0.647 
Syria    0.932 0.978 0.340 
Tunisia    -0.593 0.963 0.538 
P-value of  Hausman test                               0.0146595 
 
Among dummy variables, common border is known statistically insignificant determinant of the 
volume of exports between countries in the MENA region. In addition, volume of exports 
between two countries which share a common language is 1.32% higher than for the two 
countries that do not share a common language based on the fixed effects estimation and Rose 
(2000)'s specification. Also, based on the fixed effects estimation volume of exports between two 
countries which share a common colony history is 2.18% higher than for two countries that do 
not share a common colony history. Moreover, the fixed effects estimation confirms that 
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convergence in GDP per is found to be statistically insignificant determinant of volume of 
exports between countries in the MENA region.  
5.4.2 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of the MENA Region based on 
Sapir (2001)'s Specifications 
Sapir (2001) introduced a gravity model based on the explanatory variables such as economic 
size, distance and common language. Based on Sapir (2001)'s specifications and Table 5.10, all 
variables included in this specification are correctly signed and statistically significant 
determinant of trade flow between countries in the MENA region based on the random effects 
estimation. Moreover, the Hausman test confirms consistency of the coefficients estimated by the 
random effects estimation due to the fact that the magnitude of p-value, 0.111882, is larger than 
0.05. Hence, by this specification it is safe to use the random effects estimation. From Table 5.10 
it is concluded that if economic size of two countries (in a given pair) increases by one percent 
exports flow between those countries increases by about .35%. In addition, the coefficient of 
distance is also strongly negative, implying that a one percent increase in distance between two 
countries decreases volume of exports by about .87%.  
Table 5.10 Results of gravity model by Sapir (2001), MENA region 
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Sapir (2001), MENA region 
Estimation Methods RE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -15.553 *** 2.515 <0.00001 
ln ECOSIZE 0.350 *** 0.033 <0.00001 
ln DIS -0.866 *** 0.240 0.0003 
COMLANG 1.437 *** 0.451 0.001 
P-value of  Hausman test                               0.111882 
 
Moreover, the random effects estimation shows that the volume of trade between two countries 
which share a common language is 1.44% higher than for two countries that do not share a 
common language based on Sapir (2001)'s specification. 
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5.4.3 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of the MENA Region based on 
Egger (2002)'s Specifications 
Table 5.11 shows the results of the gravity model for our dataset on the MENA region based on 
Egger (2002)'s specifications. Based on the random effects estimation, variables such as 
economic size, distance and common language have the expected sign and are statistically 
significant. Moreover, common border, income similarity and convergence in GDP per capita are 
known statistically insignificant determinants of the exports flow.  
However, the Hausman test confirms that coefficients estimated by the random effects estimation 
are not the same as ones estimated by the fixed effects estimation. Therefore, by going through 
the fixed effects estimation following results is achieved. Coefficient of variable ‘economic size’ 
confirms that the exports volumes between the countries are positively and significantly related to 
this variable. A one percent increase in economic size raises volume of exports by about .34 
percent.  
If distance between two countries decreases by one percent volume of trade increases by about 
1.02 percent. Common border is found to be insignificant determinant of volume of exports. 
Common language is significant determinant of volume of exports between the countries in the 
MENA region with a positive impact. Volume of trade between the two countries which share a 
common language is 1.02 percent higher than for two countries that do not share a common 
language based on the fixed effects estimation and Egger (2002)'s specification. However, the 
fixed effects estimation shows the insignificant role of income similarity and convergence in 
GDP per capita as determinants of volume of exports between the countries in the MENA region.  
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Table 5.11 Results of gravity model by Egger (2002), MENA region 
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Egger (2002), MENA region 
Estimation 
Methods 
RE Std. Error p-value FE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -15.449 *** 2.901 <0.00001 -12.964*** 2.931 0.00001 
ln ECOSIZE 0.344 *** 0.040 <0.00001 0.344 *** 0.040 <0.00001 
ln DIS -0.847 *** 0.299 0.005 -1.027 *** 0.285 0.0003 
COMBOR 0.050 0.830 0.952 0.026 0.757 0.972 
COMLANG 1.425 *** 0.471 0.003 1.020 ** 0.498 0.040 
S 0.037 0.167 0.824 -0.002 0.166 0.992 
ln  GDPCAP 0.016 0.056 0.775 0.030 0.057 0.600 
Albania    -4.361 *** 0.919 <0.00001 
Algeria    -1.087 0.993 0.274 
Croatia    -0.406 0.919 0.658 
Egypt    -1.062 0.966 0.271 
Israel    -3.989 *** 0.959 0.00003 
Jordan    -0.118 0.971 0.903 
Lebanon    -0.837 0.995 0.400 
Mauritania    -0.529 1.045 0.613 
Morocco    -0.123 0.997 0.902 
Syria    0.521 0.990 0.598 
Tunisia    -0.964 0.977 0.324 
P-value of  Hausman test                                 0.00736666 
 
5.4.4 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of the MENA Region based on 
Peridy (2005)'s Specifications 
Table 5.12 shows the results derived from a gravity model inspired from Peridy (2005). Based on 
the random effects estimation, all variables have the expected sign and are statistically significant 
(except common border) determinant of exports flow between the countries in the MENA region. 
In addition, the null hypothesis of the random effects estimation is not rejected by the Hausman 
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test. Hence, by this specification it is safe to use the random effects estimation. From Table 5.12, 
it is concluded that if economic size of two countries (in a given pair) increases by one percent 
exports flow between those countries increases by about .35 percent. In addition, the coefficient 
for distance is also strongly negative, implying that a one percent increase in distance between 
two countries decreases the volume of exports by about .86 percent. Moreover, the random 
effects estimation shows that the volume of exports between two countries which share a 
common language is 1.43 percent higher than for two countries that do not share a common 
language based on Peridy (2005)'s specification. 
Table 5.12 Results of gravity model by Peridy (2005), MENA region 
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Peridy (2005), MENA region 
Estimation Methods RE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -15.6122 *** 2.870 <0.00001 
ln ECOSIZE 0.350 *** 0.033 <0.00001 
ln DIS -0.857 *** 0.301 0.004 
COMBOR 0.040 0.843 0.961 
COMLANG 1.430 *** 0.475 0.002 
P-value of  Hausman test                                 0.113 
 
5.4.5 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of the MENA Region based on 
Warin, Wunnava et al (2008)'s Specifications 
Among gravity variables introduced by Warin, Wunnava et al (2008) in Table 5.13, only distance 
and market size are known statistically significant determinant of volume of exports between 
countries in the MENA region based on the random effects estimation.  
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Table 5.13 Results of gravity model by Warin, Wunnava et al (2008), MENA region 
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Warin, Wunnava et al (2008), MENA region 
Estimation Methods RE Std. Error p-value FE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -18.527 *** 5.799 0.002 -15.481 ** 6.401 0.016 
ln DIS -0.932 ** 0.413 0.025 -1.227 *** 0.394 0.002 
ln INT -0.247 0.193 0.202 -0.304 0.196 0.123 
ln BUDG 0.014 0.109 0.895 -0.026 0.109 0.813 
ln DEBT -0.037 0.095 0.699 -0.038 0.094 0.687 
G 0.881 *** 0.197 0.00001 0.854 *** 0.206 0.00005 
S 0.302 0.514 0.557 -0.019 0.503 0.970 
R -0.281 0.240 0.244 -0.108 0.240 0.652 
Albania    -7.560 *** 2.095 0.0003 
Algeria    0.848 1.483 0.568 
Croatia    0.010 1.391 0.994 
Egypt    -0.015 1.375 0.991 
Israel    -3.401 ** 1.341 0.011 
Jordan    -0.022 1.410 0.987 
Lebanon    0.062 1.415 0.965 
Morocco    -0.021 1.453 0.988 
P-value of  Hausman test                                 0.00155505 
 
However, the null hypothesis of the random effects estimation is rejected again by Hausman test. 
Hence, the fixed effects estimation can be seen as a more efficient alternative to the random 
effects estimation.  
The coefficient of distance in the fixed effects estimation is strongly negative implying that a one 
percent increase in distance between two countries decreases the volume of exports by about 1.23 
percent. Moreover, if variable market size of two countries increases by one percent, the volume 
of exports increases by about .85 percent.  
Other explanatory variables such as convergence in interest rate, convergence in budget deficit, 
convergence in government debt, income similarity and also relative difference of countries in 
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terms of factor endowment are found to be statistically insignificant determinant of volume of 
exports based on the fixed effects estimation.  
5.4.6 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of the MENA Region based on 
Warin, Wunnava et al (2009)'s Specifications 
Based on Warin, Wunnava et al (2009)'s specifications and Table 5.14, economic size, distance, 
common border and common language are known statistically significant among all variables 
included in this specification based on the random effects estimation. However, the Hausman test 
confirms the rejection of null hypothesis of the random effects estimation. Therefore, the 
following results are achieved based on the fixed effects estimation. Among all variables, 
economic size is highly significant determinant of the volume of exports between two countries 
in a given pair in the MENA region. A one percent increase in economic size of two countries 
increases the volume of exports by about .59 percent. In addition, the coefficient of distance is 
strongly negative, implying that a one percent increase in distance between two countries in the 
MENA region decreases the volume of exports by about 1.23 percent. Among dummy variables, 
only common language is highly significant determinant of the volume of exports with the 
expected sign. Volume of Exports between two countries which share a common language is 1.68 
percent higher than for two countries that do not share a common language based on Warin, 
Wunnava et al (2009)'s specification. The following variables are found to be insignificant based 
on Warin, Wunnava et al (2009)'s specification by the fixed effects estimator: common border, 
and common colony, convergence in budget, inflation, debt, expenditure, reserve position and 
GDP per capita.  
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Table 5.14 Results of gravity model by Warin, Wunnava et al (2009), MENA region 
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Warin, Wunnava et al (2009), MENA region 
Estimation 
Methods 
RE Std. Error p-value FE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -21.599 *** 5.096 0.00003 -22.935 *** 5.144 0.00001 
ln ECOSIZE 0.552 *** 0.095 <0.00001 0.589 *** 0.094 <0.00001 
ln DIS -1.137 *** 0.416 0.007 -1.229 *** 0.373 0.001 
COMBOR -1.832 * 1.088 0.093 -1.369 0.961 0.155 
COMLANG 1.862 *** 0.596 0.001 1.683 *** 0.565 0.003 
COMCOL 1.545 1.225 0.208 0.665 1.060 0.531 
ln BUDG -0.050 0.116 0.664 -0.099 0.114 0.389 
ln INF -0.016 0.098 0.866 -0.039 0.096 0.686 
ln DEBT -0.082 0.106 0.439 -0.080 0.104 0.441 
ln EXP -0.007 0.096 0.943 0.051 0.094 0.588 
ln RES -0.070 0.0757 0.353 -0.115 0.074 0.123 
ln  GDPCAP -0.171 0.131 0.191 -0.048 0.130 0.711 
Albania    -7.480 *** 1.564 <0.00001 
Algeria    -0.222 1.075 0.836 
Croatia    0.144 1.017 0.887 
Egypt    -0.711 0.972 0.465 
Israel    -3.477 *** 1.039 0.0009 
Jordan    0.258 1.024 0.801 
Lebanon    -0.181 1.045 0.862 
Morocco    -0.043 1.051 0.967 
Tunisia    0.847 1.066 0.427 
P-value of  Hausman test                                 0.00261295 
 
5.4.7 Country Fixed Effects in the MENA Region 
The results on country fixed effects in the MENA region is also the same as results in the 
Mediterranean Union. The reason is clear. Countries investigated in the Mediterranean Union are 
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the same countries investigated in the MENA region plus the EU as a whole.  However, the EU 
in our dataset is not considered as an exporter. Hence, dummy magnitude of this economy in the 
Mediterranean Union is zero. Therefore, for both regions, the Mediterranean Union and the 
MENA region, results on the country fixed effects are the same. 
5.5 Analysing Integration of the Potential Group of Countries in the 
MENA Region Based on Six Gravity Models 
In this section, first it is tried to find a potential group of countries in the MENA region which are 
predicted to be appropriate candidates for integration. Then, the examination is done based on the 
six mentioned gravity models. Conclusion on this debate comes out from the combination of 
results of these six gravity models. 
5.5.1 Finding a Potential Group of Countries in the MENA Region 
In the last region investigated in this study, we try to find a potential group of countries which 
might be appropriate candidates for integration. To find the potential group, two steps are done. 
In the first step, it is tried to find potential groups of countries within the MENA region based on 
the descriptive analysis which was mentioned in the previous chapter. Second step investigates 
suitability of these groups to be integrated based on the fixed effects and random effects 
estimators.  
Step 1: Finding Potential Groups of Countries within the MENA Region: 
There are three procedures in this step: 
Procedures 1: Finding Potential Groups Containing Two Countries 
a) Finding potential groups containing two economies, is done based on Table 4.26 in 
descriptive analysis (chapter 4). This table shows the direction of exports (ascending or 
descending) through the years from each economy to its partners. A basic selection is 
performed by choosing pairs with ascending exports to each other through the years. For 
instance, by looking at Albania as an exporter in Table 4.26, it is determined that exports 
from Albania to Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Turkey is ascending through the years. 
Moreover, exports from Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Turkey (as exporters) to Albania (as the 
importer) are also ascending through the years. Therefore, in the basic selection, we have 
  105 
 
pairs such as Albania-Egypt, Albania-Jordan, Albania-Syria and Albania-Turkey. The 
same is done for all economies.  
b) Among selected pairs, ones with less than 7 appropriate conditions based on tables 4.3, 
4.5, 4.7, 4.9, 4.11, 4.13, 4.15, 4.17, 4.19, 4.21, 4.23 and 4.25 will be removed. These 
tables show appropriate conditions in the perspective of independent variables related to 
each pair. for instance in Table 4.3, on the one hand, cell with color green related to 
independent variable, number 4(absolute value of difference of GDP growth) , and 
economy, turkey, (as a partner of Albania) shows the potential suitability of the pair 
Albania-turkey for integration in the perspective of independent variable “absolute value 
of GDP growth”. on the other hand, cell related to independent variable, number 
7(absolute value of difference of budget deficit), and economy, Turkey, (as a partner of 
Albania) shows likely unsuitability of the pair Albania-Turkey for integration in the 
perspective of independent variable “absolute value of difference of budget deficit”. For 
all pairs selected in the part ‘a’ we compute the number of cells with green color (showing 
appropriate condition) and remove ones for which number of green color are less than 7. 
Hence, based on this explanation the pair Albania-Syria selected in previous section is 
removed because the appropriate conditions for this pair in the perspective of independent 
variables are less than seven.  
c) The last procedure to find groups containing two economies is adding pairs that are 
considered the most important partners to each other based on sum and average of exports 
in tables 4.2, 4.4, 4.6, 4.8, 4.10, 4.12, 4.14, 4.16, 4.18, 4.20, 4.22 and 4.24. For instance, 
based on Table 4.2, it is determined that Croatia is one of the most important partners 
(importer from Albania) for Albania and Albania is also one of the most important 
partners (importer from Croatia) for Croatia (based on Table 4.6). Therefore, the pair 
Albania-Croatia is added to groups containing two economies which might be suitable 
candidates for integration. Table 5.15 shows procedures a, b and c for pairs containing 
Albania.  
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Table 5.15 Procedures of finding potential groups containing 2 countries include Albania 
Selected pairs (based 
on part a) 
removed pairs (based 
on part b) 
added pairs (based on 
part c) 
Final potential pairs
Albania-Egypt   Albania-Egypt 
Albania-Jordan   Albania-Jordan 
Albania-Syria Albania-Syria   
Albania-Turkey   Albania-Turkey 
  Albania-Croatia Albania-Croatia 
 
The same procedures are performed for all economies. Table 5.16 shows all final potential pairs 
which might be suitable candidates for integration in our sample. In this table, the first column 
shows all economies (other than Mauritania) from the MENA region in our sample.  
 
Table 5.16 All potential groups containing 2 countries for integration 
Albania Croatia _ Egypt _ Jordan _ Turkey 
Algeria Lebanon _ Morocco _ Tunisia _Turkey 
Croatia Egypt _ Israel _ Morocco _ Turkey 
Egypt Jordan _ Lebanon _ Mauritania _ Morocco _ Syria _ Turkey 
Israel Jordan _ Turkey 
Jordan Lebanon _ Morocco _ Syria _ Tunisia 
Lebanon Mauritania _ Morocco _ Syria 
Morocco Syria _ Tunisia _ Turkey 
Syria Tunisia _ Turkey 
Tunisia Turkey 
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In addition, partners (importers or exporters) of each economy are presented in front of the 
economy (second column)15. All in all, there are 35 potential groups containing two economies 
which might be suitable candidates for integration. 
Procedure 2: Finding Potential Groups Containing Three Countries 
Finding potential groups containing 3 countries is performed based on Table 5.16. This 
Procedure is explained by an example. In Table 5.16 Croatia is in front of Albania and Egypt 
also, is in front of Croatia and Albania. Therefore a group containing Albania, Croatia and Egypt 
is obtained. These three countries in this group are linked to each other two by two. Again, 
Croatia is in front of Albania and Israel is in front of Croatia but not in front of Albania. Hence, a 
group containing Albania, Croatia and Israel is not considered as a potential group. The same is 
happened for the group containing Albania, Croatia and Morocco because Croatia is a partner of 
Albania, and Morocco is a partner for Croatia but not for Albania so there is no group containing 
Albania, Croatia and Morocco. Finally, we have the pairs Albania-Croatia, Croatia-Turkey and 
also Albania-Turkey. Hence a group containing Albania, Croatia and Turkey is considered as a 
potential group. By doing this Procedure for all economies and their partners, 40 groups 
containing three countries are achieved which are presented in Table 5.17. 
  
                                                 
15 There are no repeated pairs in this table. For instance, Albania is not mentioned in front of Egypt because, Egypt is 
already in front of Albania. Put differentially, there is no difference between the pairs Albania-Egypt and Egypt-
Albania.  
  108 
 
Table 5.17 All potential groups containing 3 countries for integration 
 
Albania-Croatia-Egypt 
Albania-Croatia-Turkey 
Albania-Egypt-Jordan 
Albania-Egypt-Turkey 
 
Algeria-Lebanon-Morocco 
Algeria-Lebanon-Tunisia 
Algeria-Lebanon-Turkey 
Algeria-Morocco-Tunisia 
Algeria-Morocco-Turkey 
Algeria-Tunisia-Turkey 
 
Croatia-Egypt-Morocco 
Croatia-Egypt-Turkey 
Croatia-Israel-Turkey 
Croatia-Morocco-Turkey 
 
Egypt-Jordan-Lebanon 
Egypt-Jordan-Morocco 
Egypt-Jordan-Syria 
Egypt-Lebanon-Mauritania 
Egypt-Lebanon-Morocco 
Egypt-Lebanon-Syria 
Egypt-Lebanon-Turkey 
Egypt-Morocco-Syria 
Egypt-Morocco-Turkey 
Egypt-Syria-Turkey 
 
 
Jordan-Lebanon-Morocco 
Jordan-Lebanon-Syria 
Jordan-Lebanon-Tunisia 
Jordan-Morocco-Syria 
Jordan-Morocco-Tunisia 
Jordan-Syria-Tunisia 
 
 
Lebanon-Morocco-Syria 
Lebanon-Morocco-Tunisia 
Lebanon-Morocco-Turkey 
Lebanon-Syria-Tunisia 
Lebanon-Syria-Turkey 
Lebanon-Tunisia-Turkey 
 
Morocco-Syria-Tunisia 
Morocco-Syria-Turkey 
Morocco-Tunisia-Turkey 
 
Syria-Tunisia-Turkey 
 
 
Procedure 3: Finding Potential Groups Containing Four and Five Countries 
We try to find the potential groups composed of 4 countries based on the groups in Table 5.16 
and Table 5.17. The following example shows this procedure. The procedure is started with the 
first group in the Table 5.17, which is “Albania-Croatia-Egypt”. Among all partners of Croatia 
and Egypt, which can be seen in Table 5.16 (e.g. Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, 
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Syria and Turkey) Turkey is the only one that is a partner for Croatia and Egypt as well as a 
partner of Albania. Hence, the first group composed of 4 countries is “Albania-Croatia-Egypt-
Turkey”. Table 5.18 shows all potential groups composed of 4 countries gained by doing the 
same procedure on all groups in Table 5.17. 
Table 5.18 All potential groups contain of 4 countries for integration 
1. Albania-Croatia-Egypt-Turkey 
2. Algeria-Lebanon-Morocco-Tunisia 
3. Algeria-Lebanon-Morocco-Turkey 
4. Algeria-Lebanon-Tunisia-Turkey 
5. Algeria-Morocco-Tunisia-Turkey 
6. Croatia-Egypt-Morocco-Turkey 
7. Egypt-Jordan-Lebanon-Morocco 
8. Egypt-Jordan-Lebanon-Syria 
9. Egypt-Jordan-Morocco-Syria 
10. Egypt-Lebanon-Morocco-Syria 
11. Egypt-Lebanon-Morocco-Turkey 
12. Egypt-Lebanon-Syria-Turkey 
13. Egypt-Morocco-Syria-Turkey 
14. Jordan-Lebanon-Syria-Tunisia 
15. Jordan-Morocco-Syria-Tunisia 
16. Lebanon-Morocco-Syria-Tunisia 
17. Lebanon-Morocco-Syria-Turkey 
18. Lebanon-Morocco-Tunisia-Turkey 
19. Lebanon-Syria-Tunisia-Turkey 
20. Morocco-Syria-Tunisia-Turkey 
 
Table 5.16 and Table 5.18 are the start points to finding potential groups composed of five 
countries. First, imagine the first group in Table 5.18 which is “Albania-Croatia-Egypt-Turkey”. 
Then, consider all partners of Croatia, Egypt and Turkey which can be seen in Table 5.16 (e.g. 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco and Syria). None of these countries can be added 
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to the group “Albania-Croatia-Egypt-Turkey” because of the following reasons based on Table 
5.16: 
 Israel is not a partner of Albania;  
 Jordan is not a partner of Croatia and Turkey; 
 Lebanon is not a partner of Albania and Croatia;  
 Mauritania is not a partner of Albania, Croatia and Turkey;  
 Morocco is not a partner of Albania and  
 Syria is not a partner of Albania. 
The first group of 5 countries is “Algeria-Lebanon-Morocco-Tunisia-Turkey”, which is 
originated from the second group (“Algeria-Lebanon-Morocco-Tunisia”) in Table 5.18. Among 
all partners of Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia, Turkey is the only one which is a partner of 
Algeria, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia. Table 5.19 shows all potential groups composed of 5 
countries gained by doing the same procedure on all groups in Table 5.18.  
Table 5.19 All potential groups containing 5 countries for integration 
1. Algeria-Lebanon-Morocco-Tunisia-Turkey 
2. Egypt-Jordan-Lebanon-Morocco-Syria 
3. Egypt-Lebanon-Morocco-Syria-Turkey 
4. Jordan-Lebanon-Morocco-Syria-Tunisia 
5. Lebanon-Morocco-Syria-Tunisia-Turkey 
 
Countries in Table 5.19 are expected to be the best candidates for integration because of having 
the most similarities with each other based on three mentioned procedures. Hence, by integrating 
these countries a group of countries is achieved include: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.  
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5.5.2 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of 8 Selected Countries in the 
MENA Region based on Rose (2000)'s Specifications 
Based on Table 5.20, among all variables investigated by Rose (2000) economic size, distance 
and convergence in GDP per capita are statistically significant determinants of the volume of 
exports. However, variables such as common border, common language and common colony are 
found to be insignificant determinants of exports volume based on Rose (2000)'s specification 
and the random effects estimation. However, the Hausman test confirms consistency of 
coefficients estimated by the random effects. Hence, the null hypothesis of the random effects 
estimation is not rejected. 
Based on the random effects estimation, the magnitude of the coefficient of economic size 
suggests that a one percent increase in economic size increases the volume of exports by about 
.34 percent. Moreover, a one percent increase in distance between two countries in the sample of 
countries estimated in this study decreases exports volume by about .84 percent.  
Table 5.20 Results of gravity model by Rose (2000), eight countries from the MENA region 
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Rose (2000), 8 selected countries from the MENA region 
Estimation 
Method 
RE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -13.563 *** 1.937 <0.00001 
ln ECOSIZE 0.338 *** 0.033 <0.00001 
ln DIS -0.841 *** 0.166 <0.00001 
COMBOR 0.423 0.435 0.331 
COMLANG -0.084 0.393 0.831 
COMCOL -0.092 0.549 0.867 
ln  GDPCAP 0.112 *** 0.041 0.006 
P-value of  Hausman test                                 0.0933992 
 
As mentioned, all dummy variables are statistically insignificant determinant of exports volume. 
However, convergence in GDP per capita is statistically significant and has a negative impact on 
the volume of exports. Put differentially, the lower the absolute value of difference of GDP per 
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capita between two countries the lower the volume of exports. A one percent decrease in absolute 
value of difference of GDP per capita between two countries decreases the volume of exports by 
.11 percent. 
5.5.3 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of 8 Selected Countries in MENA 
Region based on Sapir (2001)'s Specifications 
The random effects estimation in Table 5.21 confirms that economic size has a highly significant 
impact on the volume of exports between countries. The magnitude of the coefficients suggests 
that a one percent increase in economic size raises the volume of exports by about .38 percent. 
The coefficient of distance is also strongly negative, implying that a one percent increase in 
distance between two countries decreases the volume of exports by about .98 percent. However, 
having the same language is not statistically significant determinant of exports volume between 
the countries. The Hausman test confirms the consistency of coefficients estimated by the random 
effects.  
 
Table 5.21 Results of gravity model by Sapir (2001), eight countries from the MENA region 
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Sapir (2001), 8 selected countries from the MENA region 
Estimation 
Method 
RE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -13.965 *** 1.749 <0.00001 
ln ECOSIZE 0.383 *** 0.029 <0.00001 
ln DIS -0.978*** 0.133 <0.00001 
COMLANG -0.066 0.311 0.832 
P-value of  Hausman test                                 0.284693 
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5.5.4 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of 8 Selected Countries in the 
MENA Region based on Egger (2002)'s Specifications 
Based on Egger (2002)'s specification and Table 5.22 variables such as economic size, distance 
and income similarity have the expected sign and are statistically significant determinants of the 
exports volume. Speaking the same language is lowly significant determinant of the exports 
volume with a negative impact. On the other hand, convergence in GDP per capita is highly 
significant with a negative impact on the exports volume. By taking into account the Hausman 
test, it is concluded that coefficients estimated by the random effects are not consistence. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis of the random effects is rejected and the fixed effects estimation is 
used as an alternative to the random effects estimation. The following results are achieved based 
on the fixed effects estimation.  
The coefficient of variable ‘economic size’ confirms that exports volumes between countries are 
positively related to this variable. If economic size of two countries in a given pair increases by 
one percent, exports volume increases by .38 percent. In addition, coefficient of distance is 
strongly negative, implying that a one percent increase in distance decreases the volume of 
exports by about .78 percent.  
Among dummy variables, common border is statistically insignificant. Surprisingly, a common 
language has a negative impact on the exports volume. More specifically, the exports volume 
between two countries which share a common language is 1.29 percent less than for two 
countries that do not share a common language based on the fixed effects estimation. Income 
similarity has a positive impact on the exports volume. By positive impact it is meant here that if 
incomes of two countries in a given pair become similar by one percent, the volume of exports 
increases by about .75 percent. However, convergence in GDP per capita is statistically 
significant and has a negative impact on the volume of exports. A one percent decrease in 
absolute value of difference of GDP per capita between two countries decreases the volume of 
exports by .10 percent. 
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Table 5.22 Results of gravity model by Egger (2002), eight countries from the MENA region 
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Egger (2002), 8 selected countries from the MENA region 
Estimation 
Methods 
RE Std. Error p-value FE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -12.720*** 1.929 <0.00001 -15.387 *** 1.816 <0.00001 
ln ECOSIZE 0.355 *** 0.034 <0.00001 0.380 *** 0.033 <0.00001 
ln DIS -0.893 *** 0.165 <0.00001 -0.780 *** 0.138 <0.00001 
COMBOR 0.267 0.423 0.528 0.219 0.341 0.520 
COMLANG -0.653 * 0.348 0.061 -1.293 *** 0.330 0.0001 
S 0.757 *** 0.195 0.0001 0.751 *** 0.176 0.00002 
ln  GDPCAP 0.121 *** 0.041 0.003 0.101 ** 0.039 0.011 
Algeria    0.631 0.461 0.171 
Egypt    0.717 0.460 0.120 
Jordan    2.428 *** 0.461 <0.00001 
Lebanon    1.010 ** 0.462 0.029 
Morocco    1.046 ** 0.463 0.024 
Syria    2.381 *** 0.460 <0.00001 
Tunisia    1.599 *** 0.455 0.0004 
P-value of  Hausman test                                 0.0111351 
 
5.5.5 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of 8 Selected Countries in the 
MENA Region based on Peridy (2005)'s Specifications 
Among gravity variables introduced in Peridy (2005), economic size and distance are known 
statistically significant determinants of the exports volume with the expected sign based on the 
random effects variables. However, the random effects estimation shows that common border and 
common language are statistically insignificant. The magnitude of the p-value by the Hausman 
test confirms that the coefficients estimated by the random effects are consistence. Therefore, 
based on the random effects estimation a one percent increases in economic size increases the 
volume of exports by about .38 percent. In addition, the coefficient of distance in the fixed effects 
estimation confirms that a one percent increase in distance between two countries decreases the 
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exports volume by about .90 percent. Table 5.23 shows the results derived from Peridy (2005)'s 
specifications. 
Table 5.23 Results of gravity model by Peridy (2005), eight countries from the MENA region 
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Peridy (2005), 8 selected countries from the MENA region 
Estimation 
Methods 
RE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -14.5784 *** 1.89663 <0.00001 
ln ECOSIZE 0.383032 *** 0.0294238 <0.00001 
ln DIS -0.898258 *** 0.16402 <0.00001 
COMBOR 0.354224 0.422292 0.40181 
COMLANG -0.0711319 0.311696 0.81954 
P-value of  Hausman test                                 0.250424 
 
5.5.6 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of 8 Selected Countries in the 
MENA Region based on Warin, Wunnava et al (2008)'s Specifications 
Among the gravity variables introduced by Warin, Wunnava et al (2008) in Table 5.24, distance, 
and convergence in debt, market size and relative difference in terms of factor endowment are 
known statistically significant determinants of the volume of exports between the countries 
investigated in this section based on the random effects estimation. However, the null hypothesis 
of the random effects estimation is rejected again by the Hausman test. Hence, the fixed effects 
estimation takes into account and shows that distance, convergence in debt and market size are 
highly significant determinants of the exports volume. Also, variables like income similarity and 
factor endowment are statistically significant at 0.05 and 0.10 levels. All of these significant 
variables have the expected sign. Based on the fixed effects estimation, coefficient of distance 
shows that a one percent increase in distance between two countries decreases the volume of 
exports by about .91 percent. 
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Table 5.24 Results of gravity model by Warin, Wunnava et al (2008), eight countries from the 
MENA region 
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Warin, Wunnava et al (2008), 8 selected countries from the MENA region 
Estimation 
Methods 
RE Std. Error p-value FE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -15.775 *** 3.564 0.0002 -22.368 *** 3.942 <0.0001 
ln DIS -1.045 *** 0.260 0.0001 -0.910 *** 0.246 0.00034 
ln INT 0.012 0.151 0.937 0.164 0.152 0.282 
ln BUDG 0.003 0.060 0.960 0.010 0.060 0.863 
ln DEBT -0.314 *** 0.095 0.001 -0.315 *** 0.096 0.001 
G 0.896 *** 0.140 <0.0001 1.070 *** 0.144 <0.0001 
S 0.469 0.348 0.180 0.706 ** 0.337 0.038 
R -0.350 * 0.188 0.065 -0.370 * 0.189 0.053 
Algeria    0.925 0.681 0.177 
Egypt    1.101 0.670 0.103 
Jordan    2.082 *** 0.719 0.004 
Lebanon    1.828 *** 0.688 0.009 
Morocco    0.872 0.724 0.230 
P-value of  Hausman test                                 0.0213312    
 
In addition, based on the fixed effects estimator, if absolute value of difference of government 
debt of two countries decreases by one percent, volume of export increases by about .32 percent.   
Among Hecksher Ohlin variables, the coefficient of market size confirms that if market size of 
two countries increases by one percent the volume of exports increases by 1.07 percent. 
Moreover, a one percent increase in the variable income similarity of two countries increases the 
volume of exports by about .71 percent with 0.05 level of significant. In addition, if relative 
difference of two countries in terms of factor endowment increases by one percent, volume of 
exports decreases by .37 percent with 0.10 level of significant. However, variables such as 
convergence in interest rate and budge are insignificant determinants of volume of exports based 
on the fixed effects estimation. 
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5.5.7 Gravity Model of Trade Integration of 8 Selected Countries in the 
MENA Region based on Warin, Wunnava et al (2009)'s Specifications 
Based on Table 5.25, among all variables introduced by Warin, Wunnava et al (2009), economic 
size, distance and convergence in debt are statistically significant determinant of volume of 
exports based on the random effects estimation. Theses significant variables have the expected 
sign as well.  
Table 5.25 Results of gravity model by Warin, Wunnava et al (2009), eight countries from the 
MENA region 
Random effects and fixed effects  Estimations 1995-2010 
[Double Log Specification], Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
Based on model Warin, Wunnava et al (2009), 8 selected countries from the MENA region 
Estimation 
Methods 
RE Std. Error p-value 
CONSTANT -13.8131 *** 3.10828 0.00002 
ln ECOSIZE 0.382186 *** 0.0593417 <0.00001 
ln DIS -0.997565 *** 0.218527 <0.00001 
COMBOR 0.208117 0.579651 0.72000 
COMLANG 0.271826 0.442211 0.53956 
COMCOL -0.559841 0.627242 0.37333 
ln BUDG -0.0891495 0.0612483 0.14732 
ln INF 0.0521304 0.0549342 0.34396 
ln DEBT -0.294787 *** 0.0963539 0.00257 
ln EXP 0.0334927 0.0477802 0.48425 
ln RES -0.0175414 0.0500584 0.72645 
ln  GDPCAP 0.124365 0.0773456 0.10967 
P-value of  Hausman test                                 0.918363 
 
The Hausman test confirms that coefficients estimated by the random effects estimation are the 
same as the ones estimated by the fixed effects due to the fact that p-value of this test is 
0.918363. Therefore, it is safe to go through the coefficients estimated by the random effects 
estimator.  
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The coefficient of economic size confirms that a one percent increase in this variable increases 
the volume of exports by about .38 percent. Moreover a one percent increase in distance between 
two countries increases the volume of exports between those countries by about 1%. Also, if 
absolute value of difference of government debt of two countries decreases by one percent, 
volume of exports increases by about .29 percent based on the random effects estimator. 
5.5.8 Country Fixed Effects in 8 Selected Countries from the MENA Region 
Lastly, we briefly mention the symmetric country dummy variables that are proxies for countries’ 
participation as either source of exports or origin of imports within the eight selected countries 
from the MENA region. Among all models, two model of Egger (2002) and Warin (2008) rejects 
the null hypothesise of the random effects estimation. Interestingly, based on the fixed effects 
estimation of these two models the most active country in terms of exports during the period 
observed have been Jordan, Syria and Tunisia based on Egger (2002) model. However, based on 
Warin (2008) model, the most active country in terms of exports during the period observed have 
been Jordan and Lebanon.  
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CHAPITRE 6 CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Our analysis shows that the prospect for further integration of the three regions is promising and 
looks encouraging, but many challenges still have to be overcome. These challenges could be 
such as political relationships or some existing economic blocks which provide a first stepping 
stone to a larger currency union. Although the time-frame of this study ranges from 1995 to 2010, 
the research was conducted during the occurrence of important developments that are challenging 
the strength of the European Union. As such challenges could be the Greek crisis and the German 
treat to break the Euro. In late 2009 fears of a sovereign debt crisis developed among investors 
concerning Greek’s ability to meet its debt obligations due to strong increase in government 
levels (Higgins and Klitgaard 2012). 
 Our results confirm that the gravity model is applicable to the three regions based on the 
traditional gravity variables: economic size and distance. Higher economic size and lower 
distance between the countries leads to deeper trade flow between the countries. In addition, 
analysis of the three regions show that exports volume between the countries is positively and 
significantly correlated with the product of the economic size of the countries in a given pair. The 
effects of the other variables vary among the three regions investigated in this study. Conclusion 
on each region is explained separately. 
As the further research, a comparison between three regions of the Mediterranean Union, the 
MENA region and the eight countries could be performed. In this study, these three regions were 
treated independently. However, appraising the influence of different variables on one region 
could be different for the other regions. This investigation can strengthen the outcomes of this 
research as well as performing a cross comparison among the 3 regions.  
 
6.1 Conclusion on the Mediterranean Union 
This section has answered based on which criteria the Mediterranean Union countries could be 
integrated together. Results of all models represented in this study confirm that volume of exports 
between economies in the Mediterranean Union is consistence with the assumption of the gravity 
model based on two most basic and traditional gravity variables: economic size and distance.   
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All models show that economic size is a strong determinant of the economic integration in the 
Mediterranean Union countries with a positive impact. However, distance is considered as a 
barrier of exports volume between economies in the Mediterranean Union with a high significant 
role. Higher distance between countries in the Mediterranean Union leads to lower bilateral trade 
intensity. 
Among dummy variables, common language is significant by most of the models in which this 
variable is included. Countries which share a common language trade more with each other than 
those which do not share a common language. However, the two other dummy variables, 
common border and common colony are not statistically significant determinants of the volume 
of exports between countries in the Mediterranean Union.  
Furthermore, in the Mediterranean Union converging living standards do not lead to increased 
bilateral trade intensity. Likewise, countries with converging amounts of interest rate, budget 
deficit, inflation, and government debt and government expenditure share weak trade ties. 
However, convergence in reserve position is lowly statistical significant determinant of the 
exports volume between the countries in the Mediterranean Union with the expected sign based 
on the model of Warin, Wunnava et al (2009). 
Among Hecksher Ohlin variables, market size is highly significant determinant of bilateral trade 
flows between the countries in the Mediterranean Union. The larger the market sizes of two 
countries the higher the volume of exports between those countries. Moreover, income similarity 
is known to be a significant determinant of the volume of exports between the countries in the 
Mediterranean Union with a negative impact based on the model introduced by Egger (2002). 
However, relative difference of two countries in terms of factor endowment does not determine 
integration in the Mediterranean Union countries.  
6.2 Conclusion on the MENA Region 
This section has answered based on which criteria the MENA region countries could be 
integrated together. Results of all models represented in this study confirm that the volume of 
exports between the economies in the MENA region is consistence with the assumption of the 
gravity model based on two most basic and traditional gravity variables: economic size and 
distance. All models show that economic size is a highly significant determinant of integration 
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between the economies in the MENA region with a positive impact. However, distance is 
considered as a barrier of bilateral trade between the economies in the MENA region with a high 
significant role. Higher distance between the countries in the MENA region leads to lower 
bilateral trade intensity.  
Among dummy variables, common language is known to be significant by all models in which 
this variable is included. Countries which share a common language trade more with each other 
than those which do not share a common language. Common colony is statistically significant 
determinant of exports volume between the countries in the MENA region with a positive impact. 
Indeed, countries which have experienced a colonial link at any time, trade more than those 
which have not experienced a colonial link. However, the other dummy variable, common border 
is not statistically significant determinant of the volume of exports between the countries in the 
MENA region.  
The augmented gravity model illustrates that, for the MENA region, convergence in variables 
such as interest rate, budget deficit, inflation, government debt, government expenditure, reserve 
position and GDP per capita is a weak determinant of economic integration. 
Among Hecksher Ohlin variables, market size is highly significant determinant of exports 
volume between the countries in the MENA region. The larger the markets size of two countries 
the higher the bilateral trade between those countries. However, income similarity and relative 
difference of two countries in terms of factor endowment do not determine integration between 
the economies in the MENA region.    
6.3 Conclusion on Eight Selected Countries from the MENA Region 
This section has answered based on which criteria the third group of countries in our sample 
could be integrated together. The results of all models represented in this study confirm that the 
volume of exports between eight selected economies in the MENA region is consistence with the 
assumption of the gravity model based on two most basic and traditional gravity variables: 
economic size and distance. All models show that economic size is a highly significant 
determinant of integration between eight selected economies in the MENA region with a positive 
impact. However, distance is considered as a barrier of the bilateral trade between these 
economies in the MENA region with a high significant role.  
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Among dummy variables, common border and common colony are insignificant determinants of 
the volume of exports between the selected countries in the MENA region based on all models. 
However, common language is known significant determinant of the exports volume only by 
model of Egger (2002). This variable is insignificant by all other models in which this variable is 
included.  
Convergence in interest rate, budget deficit, inflation, and government expenditure and reserve 
position do not determine integration in the selected countries from the MENA region. However, 
convergence in government debt is a highly statistical significant determinant of exports volume 
between the selected countries in the MENA region with the expected sign based on two models 
in which this variable is investigated.  
Among Hecksher Ohlin variables, market size is highly significant determinant of the integration 
between countries in the selected counties from the MENA region. The larger the markets size of 
two countries the higher the volume of exports between those countries. Moreover, income 
similarity is known significant determinant of the volume of exports between countries in the 
selected counties from the MENA region with a positive impact by both model in which this 
variable is investigated. However, the relative difference of two countries in terms of factor 
endowment is lowly significant determinant of the exports volume between economies in the 
selected counties in the MENA region.    
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